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Shooting from the Lip: United States v.
Dickerson, Role [Im]morality, and the Ethics
of Legal Rhetoric
Elizabeth Fajans* and Mary R. Falk"
Lawyers engage in distinctive language behavior, brandishing a specialized
rhetoric of advocacy. Like some other "role-differentiated" lawyer behavior,'
this rhetoric has features that are undesirable from a "universalist" moral
perspective. Legal rhetoric is often over-bearing, even hostile.2 It employs
misdirection and omission, distorts opposing views, ridicules or vilifies
opponents, and uses these and other verbal strategies to make arguments that
are not convincing even to the speaker. This aggressive and deceptive
behavior is plainly inconsistent with the universal moral imperative of respect
for all persons.'
Yet, the matter is more complicated: like other forms of "role
differentiated" behavior in which lawyers engage, their wild-west rhetoric is
susceptible of strong moral justification as well as condemnation.
Justifications for otherwise morally criticizable behavior by lawyers
traditionally rely on the lawyer's role in the adversary system, maintaining
that justice (if not always truth) is best served by a high-noon duel of well-
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"Role-differentiated" behavior is the result of reasoning that "places weight upon the role
that the person occupies and locates concerns about how one ought to behave within a context
of what is required, expected, or otherwise appropriate of persons occupying that role." Richard
Wasserstrom, Roles and Morality, in THE GOOD LAWYER 25,25-26 (David Luban ed., 1984).
2 One example of hostile and disrespectful - even downright violent - language turned up
unbidden during the writing of this section. The New York Times reported that ajudge cited
an attorney for his "Rambo lawyering" and his efforts to "intimidate and harass" his opponent
by threatening in a letter to "conduct the legal equivalent of a proctology exam" on the
opponent's finances and billing practices. Benjamin Weiser, A Judge Moves to Strike a Blow
for Legal Decorum, N.Y. TIMEs, June 1, 1999, at B5.
' See infra notes 12-14 and accompanying text. We believe that some legal rhetoric is in
fact unethical. Nonetheless, to assert that it "plainly" violates widely-accepted moral strictures
is to engage in the over-certainty on complex issues that characterizes too much legal rhetoric.
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matched opponents shooting from the lip. Thus, condemnation and
justification of legal rhetoric seem equally tenable positions.
Yet, the matter is more complicated still. The adversary-system
justification of otherwise morally criticizable role-differentiated lawyer
behavior presupposes the prototype advocacy situation in which life, liberty,
or some other invaluable good depends on zealous representation. Role-
differentiated legal rhetoric seems most justified, therefore, in a summation
in a capital or other major felony trial, or in a trial memorandum or appellate
brief in some similar matter of real consequence. But lawyers are not just
litigators: they are counselors, mediators, judges, scholars, and teachers as
well. Yet, despite these "role-differentiations," the rhetorical strategies of
advocacy are used in letters, judicial opinions, law reviews, and classrooms:
no matter what the context, lawyers often talk the same talk.4
In this article, we look at the ways judges, advocates, and scholars employ
the "disrespectful" rhetorical strategies of advocacy.5 After sketching some
background theory on role-differentiated morality and the ethics of advocacy
in Part IA, we describe in Part IB some features of legal rhetoric that seem to
offend universalist notions of morality - e.g., abuse of classical rhetoric's
strategies of logos, ethos, and pathos, as exhibited in ipse dixit argument,
misuse of precedent, use of "false implicature"6 to mislead, arguing what one
does not believe, misreading opposing views, and belittling those who hold
such views. In Part II, we examine a microcosm of legal rhetoric - the
judicial, advocacy, and scholarly prose that has been engendered by one issue
in criminal procedure. Finally we examine the possible moral, institutional,
and practical justifications for the law's disrespectful rhetoric and consider
' See Gerald Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal Discourse, 76 VA. L. REV. 1545,
1550-51 (1990) ("[There is ... a discipline-specific rhetoric of law... that ... shapes our
advocacy, our judicial opinions, our scholarship, and our teaching").
5 Our focus here is on written rhetoric -judicial opinions, appellate briefs, and law review
articles. Our sense is that, given the constraints on written language (e.g., its durability and
potential for dissemination), the rhetoric of court room and conference room is even more
disrespectful. An extreme example arose during the trial of a man who poured lighter fluid over
his wife and then set her on fire. The judge "burst into song in open court crooning, 'You light
up my wife,' to the tune of 'You Light Up My Life."' Deborah Epstein, Redefining the State's
Response to Domestic Violence: Past Victories and Future Challenges, 1 GEo. J. GENDER & L.
127, 141 (1999) (citing SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, REPORT OF THE FLORIDA
SUPREME COURT GENDER BiAs STUDY COMMISSION 121 (1990)).
6 The term "implicature" is borrowed from linguistic pragmatics. Implicature is the
mechanism by which participants in a conversation understand that which is not stated. For
example, when Speaker A asks, "Would you like some coffee?," and speaker B replies, "Does
the Pope say Mass?" implicature allows Speaker A to understand Speaker B's response as "yes."
False implicature is the intentional exploitation of implicature by a speaker or writer to suggest
a proposition that is not true. See infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
2000 / SHOOTING FROM THE LIP
whether a radical change in language behavior is, realistic or not, the only
solution consistent with the duty of respect.
We conclude that the negative potential of the law's rhetoric of disrespect
is troubling enough to require radical change. The deceit, insincerity,
hyperbole, and scorn that characterize much legal rhetoric are especially
problematic because of the law's rhetoricity - the law is in large part
affirmation and declamation.7 Thus, if the law's dishonest and disrespectful
rhetoric causes it to fall into disrepute, it has no other practice with which to
redeem itself. Moreover, the rhetorical excesses of judges are especially
dangerous, because judicial rhetoric is consequential - disposing of life,
liberty, property, and reputation - and almost always immutable. Dissenters
and commentators may expose the weak arguments and mean spirits of a
judicial opinion, but short of reversal the court's words will not only stand but
resonate in future controversies.
Recourse by judges and scholars to the role-differentiated rhetoric of
advocacy is also undesirable because legal rhetoric encourages over-
simplification and over-certainty in complex situations and promises
exemption from moral agency. This recourse is obviously undesirable in
judicial decision-making, but it is hardly less infelicitous in scholarship.
Although a scholar's combativeness and over-certainty may do little real harm
to other persons - except when exercised too energetically on the work of an
untenured colleague - they nonetheless limit the writer's intellectual and
moral horizon and, thus, that of the profession.
In addition, there are serious costs incurred when judges make arguments
that do not motivate their own belief - for example, advancing precedent or
statute as the ground for decisions when their real reasons are grounded in
justice between the parties or economics, or advancing justice between the
parties as the ground for decisions that are in fact rooted in social policy. This
lack of sincerity is disrespectful, first, in that the reader is asked to stand on
ground the judge does not share. Further, it hardly encourages the reader's
respect for, or loyalty to, the legal system. Moreover, this lack of forthright-
ness incurs further cost - when we are denied the judge's real reasons, we
have no idea of the judge's true character and have no real way of predicting
future decisions.
We come to these conclusions after a look at the rhetoric that has arisen
around an issue that was pending in the Supreme Court as we wrote this
article: the status of the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona.8
' Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, in THE ETHICS OF
LAWYERS 3, 16 (David Luban ed., 1984).
' Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that unless the legislature devises
other fully effective means to inform defendants in criminal cases about their Fifth Amendment
right to silence and to assure the continuous opportunity to exercise it, defendants must be
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We chose this issue because it generated legal rhetoric at its disrespectful
worst and its respectful best in the judicial, advocacy, and scholarly contexts.
Indeed, the writing of this article was prompted by the roughness with which
readers were treated by the Fourth Circuit's decision in United States v.
Dickerson,9 on which certioriari had been granted, and which the Supreme
Court eventually reversed. Although the fate of Dickerson, and thus of
Miranda, was unresolved during most of the writing of this article, as
rhetoricians we were less interested in the outcome of the debate than in the
verbal wars waged over Miranda by judges, advocates, and scholars. Our
purpose was not to second-guess the Supreme Court but rather to articulate
ethical norms by which the rhetoric of the profession - including that of the
Court in Dickerson - can be measured. In this respect, we are pleased to note
that Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion is measured and respectful in tone
and relatively candid in argument. The worst excesses of the Fourth Circuit's
opinion have been removed to the dissent, surely a safer place for such
conduct so long as it continues to be a part of the legal culture.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Ethics
Our critique of legal rhetoric is informed in substantial part by Richard
Wasserstrom's critique of the "role-differentiated" conduct of lawyers and the
work of Robert Audi on the use of reasons in advocacy. Between them,
Wasserstrom and Audi call into question two conventional ideas about the
advised, before any custodial interrogation can begin, of the right to remain silent, the fact that
any statement may be used in evidence against them, and the right to the presence of an attorney,
retained or appointed).
9 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999) rev'd, Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000)
[hereinafter Dickerson 11] (holding that Miranda was overruled in 1968 by 18 U.S.C. § 3501).
Section 3501 purported to restore the pre-Miranda test for the admissibility of confessions in
federal court: voluntariness as determined by judicial consideration of the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the making of the confession. The Fourth Circuit's decision was
reversed by a 7-2 decision of the Supreme Court - Justices Scalia and Thomas were the lone
dissenters. See Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000) [hereinafter Dickerson III].
In an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court held that "Miranda, being a
constitutional decision of this Court, may not be in effect overruled by an Act of Congress, and
we decline to overrule Miranda ourselves." Id. at 2328. The Court's refusal to overrule
Miranda rested less on approbation than on the fact that Miranda "warnings have become part
of our national culture." Id. at 2336. The dissent accused the majority of refusing to
acknowledge that Miranda was a mistake and of taking upon itself the right to impose on
Congress and the States constraints not required by the Constitution, in short, of "convert[ing]
Miranda fromamilestone ofjudicial overreaching into the very Cheops' Pyramid... ofjudicial
arrogance." Id at 2348 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ethics of advocacy. First, Wasserstrom challenges the view that the lawyer's
role as her client's zealous representative permits the lawyer to be indifferent
to the morality of the client's goals and to the means used to effectuate those
goals. Second, Audi criticizes the view that advocates may with moral
justification adduce weak reasons made to seem strong by rhetorical skill and
adduce reasons, weak or strong, that do not motivate their own belief. Like
Wasserstrom, Audi approaches the ethics of lawyers from a universalist and
foundationalist perspective.
The work of Richard Wasserstrom and Robert Audi on roles and advocacy
raises difficult questions about the morality of traditional legal rhetoric. Both
writers suggest that any exemption from universal moral obligation conferred
by the lawyer's role is both narrow and problematic. Indeed, Wasserstrorn
and Audi seem inclined to believe that only where the stakes are life or liberty
may the demands of a lawyer's role override those of universal moral agency.
Applying this critique of the practice of law (Wasserstrom) and of advocacy
(Audi) to the rhetorical practices of lawyers, one might conclude that this
characteristically aggressive and deceptive role-differentiated language
behavior is acceptable only in persuasive writing for the court, and only in
situations of great consequence. Regardless of one's position on this issue,
however, it is not hard to conclude that disrespectful rhetoric is as frequent as
it is inappropriate in judicial opinions and legal scholarship, a contention we
try to substantiate in Part I of this article. The balance of Part I.A summarizes
Wasserstrom's and Audi's ideas on the ethics of roles and advocacy.
1. Role-differentiated amorality
The attorney-client relationship, requiring that the attorney "prefer in a
variety of ways the interests of the client .. . over those of individuals
generally,"' 0 gives rise to "role-differentiated behavior" in which it is "both
appropriate and desirable ... to put to one side considerations of various sorts
- and especially various moral considerations - that would otherwise be
relevant if not decisive."" Wasserstrom sees a tension between this role
amorality sanctioned by professional ethics and the"universalistic" dimension
of morality. Morality is concerned with "the welfare and happiness" of
individuals and with their autonomy, that is, with "the real opportunity to
fashion a life that he or she will find genuinely satisfying."13 Morality also
has to do with "the respect that is due to all persons because they are persons,
1o Wasserstrom, supra note 7, at 7.
" Id. at5.
12 Wasserstrom, supra note 1, at 28.
13 ad
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and the resulting wrongness in viewing or using members of the moral
community solely as means to some further end, as things to be used as one
might utilize artifacts or other objects." 4 "It is this universalistic dimension,"
Wasserstrom says, "that produces the tension with roles and with their
ostensibly different, more local, and particularistic way of inviting persons to
reason about what they should and should not do, and why."'"
Wasserstrom considers, but is ultimately unconvinced by, the traditional
justifications offered for the lawyer's sanctioned unconcern with the morality
of her client's goals and the means used to realize them. He considers two
basic arguments that support "the plausibility and appropriateness of role-
restricted moral reasoning" in the legal profession and are "largely compatible
with the more universalistic demands of morality.... ,"6 The first is a utilitar-
ian argument, which holds that given single-minded pursuits of clients' goals,
the legal system will end up doing more justice to more persons than would be
the case under any less stringent and focused mode of moral deliberation ....
[W]hatever desirable moral outcomes appear to be blocked by the existence of
and appeal to the role in question are in fact made more frequent and more likely
by the role than by its absence.' 7
A second basic justification for role-defined moral reasoning is grounded in
the expectation that the lawyer-client agreement will be honored. "[I1f a
prospective client and a lawyer have entered into an attorney-client
relationship,"'" even if representation involves morally objectionable means
or ends, "it is morally wrong to defeat the client's expectations about the vigor
and single-mindedness of the lawyer's actions on the client's behalf,"' 9
especially where "a client reasonably expects that the lawyer will pursue his
or her interests because the institution is already in place that creates and
defines the role-restricted behavior appropriate for lawyers."'
Wasserstrom finds these justifications plausible, but partial. In particular,
"arguments that are based simply upon the existence of roles and the creation
of de facto expectations ... are certainly not decisive arguments against
changing the nature of the roles .... [T]hat things have been done in a certain
way can never by itself constitute an adequate justification for the rightness
of continuing permanently to do them in the same way."2' Wasserstrom
concludes that "almost none of the arguments supported by appeals to roles
14 Id.
15 Wasserstrom, supra note 1, at 29.
16 Id. at 32.
'7 Id. at 30.
I ld. at 31.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 32.
21 Id. at 34-35.
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justify favoring some interests over others no matter what...." 22 In particular,
he believes that the strongestjustifications for role-differentiated amorality are
inappropriately generalized from the special case of the criminal defense
attorney.23 He explains,
[blecause a deprivation of liberty is so serious, because the prosecutorial
resources of the state are so vast, and because, perhaps, of a serious skepticism
about the rightness of punishment even where wrongdoing has occurred, it is
easy to accept the view that it makes sense to charge the defense counsel with the
job of making the best possible case for the accused - without regard, so to
speak, for the merits.24
For Wasserstrom, these special needs of a criminal defendant, coupled with
the defense attorney's role in an adversarial proceeding, may justify amoral
22 Id. at 34.
23 Wasserstrom, supra note 7, at 14.
24 Id. Wasserstrom's view is similar to that of the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. Although Rule 3.1 requires attorneys to have a non-frivolous basis for asserting or
controverting an issue, the rule contains an exception for the criminal defense bar, who "may
nevertheless so defend... as to require that every element of the case be established." Whether
the criminal defense bar is privileged to breach moral strictures by which other lawyers are
bound is a subject of debate among legal ethicists. See, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman, Symposium
on Professional Ethics, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three
Hardest Questions, 64 MicH. L REV. 1469 (1966) (arguing that the maintenance of the
adversary system, the presumption of innocence, and the obligation of lawyer/client
confidentiality at times justify conduct that frustrates the search for truth); Harry I. Subin, The
Criminal Defense Lawyer's 'Different Mission': Reflections on the 'Right' to Present a False
Case, GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 125 (1987) (arguing that a criminal lawyer should not be allowed
to put forward a defense the lawyer knows is false).
For their part, the lay public and popular media are outraged by defense tactics that strain
credulity and treat complainants or other witnesses disrespectfully. This is especially true where
the crime charged is a heinous one. A recent example is the outrage over defense tactics in the
case of police officer Justin Volpe, accused of the horrendous assault of Abner Louima, who
was beaten and sodomized with a broken stick in the bathroom of a police station. Debra Baker,
Shredding the Truth, ABA J., Oct. 1999, at 40. In his opening statement, Volpe's attorney told
the jurors that Louima's injuries were not "consistent with the nonconsensual insertion of an
object into his rectum." Id. at 41. The insinuation that Louima's injuries were the result of
consensual gay sex created public furor. The press and much of the bar felt Volpe's defense
attorney had crossed the line by raising a defense so apparently frivolous and disrespectful of
the victim. Id. The attorney said he was just doing his job. For some, this incident illustrates
the need for a revision of ethical rules so as to draw the line between zealous advocacy and
misrepresentation. Id.
It is impossible not to share the public indignation in cases like these, but there is a
serious and principled argument against reining in the defense bar: outrage at the zealous
defense of those accused of outrageous crimes assumes the defendants' guilt. Thus, unless
defense counsel's strategy involves appeal to racism, homophobia (the Volpe case may have
crossed that line) or other base feelings, due process and the presumption of innocence appear
to require that the defense bar be permitted to offend.
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role-differentiated tactics by the criminal defense bar. This special case does
not justify, however, "a comparable perspective on the part of lawyers
generally." Outside of the criminal defense context, "the role-differentiated
amorality of the lawyer is almost certainly excessive.
26
Yet, it is not only, or even primarily, what he sees as the thin, over-
generalized justifications for role-differentiated lawyer conduct that render
such conduct problematic for Wasserstrom. Even assuming much stronger
institutional justifications, role-differentiated unconcern for morality is
questionable, even undesirable, for several other reasons. First, traditional
institutional arguments assume that our institutions arejust and efficient. "To
the degree to which institutional rules and practices are unjust, unwise, and
undesirable, to that same degree is the case for the role-differentiated behavior
of the lawyer, weakened, if not destroyed. '27 Second, lawyers take on less
than admirable character traits by engaging in role-differentiated behavior -
"competitive rather than cooperative; aggressive rather than accommodating;
ruthless rather than compassionate; pragmatic rather than principled."' Third,
role-differentiated amorality may be even more problematic for lawyers than
for other professionals because of the nature of the legal profession itself. The
lawyer "directly says and affirms things,"" "tries to explain, persuade, and
convince others that the client's cause should prevail."' Lawyers talk about
justice, yet their words are for sale; "[t]he verbal, role-differentiated behavior
of the lawyer qua advocate puts the lawyer's integrity into question in a way
that distinguishes the lawyer from other professionals."'" The lawyer's
conventional role-differentiated amorality is therefore problematic even if
strong justifications for it exist.
2. The ethical use of reasons in advocacy
Robert Audi addresses some ethical concerns that arise out of one aspect of
the lawyer's role - advocacy, conceived narrowly as "the affirmative
presentation of a position represented as sound and offered for adoption by an
audience."32 Audi's thesis is that "advocacy needs an ethic of reasons, and not
just of external behavior," '33 because "morality (as Kant saw) concerns not
Wasserstrom, supra note 7, at 14.
26 u
27 Id at 15.
28 Id.
29 Id. at l6.
30 a
31 Id.
32 Robert Audi, The Ethics of Advocacy, 1 LEGAL THEORY 251,252 (1995).
13 Id. at 25 1.
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only overt behavior, but also what we inwardly do . . .." Advocacy is
"subject to stronger moral constraints than expressive conduct in general,"3
because it is an attempt to influence other human beings. The goal of an
ethics of advocacy is to integrate "the role-specific criteria for responsible
advocacy . . . with more general moral considerations, including the
requirements often conceived under the heading respect for persons."36 Audi
argues that advocates should ideally "1) have, 2) be genuinely motivated by,
and 3) offer, or at least be willing to offer, good reasons.""
Audi's exploration of the moral constraints on advocacy entails two
important distinctions: the distinction between "threshold" principles and
"desirability" principles and the distinction between "subscriptive" and
"representative" advocacy. Threshold principles are minimal standards below
which a moral advocate may not go through the use of rhetorical dirty tricks.38
Desirability principles set a higher standard; advocates may exploit the grey
area beneath these standards and above the threshold principles, but they risk
criticism for doing so." "The central idea underlying the distinction between
threshold and desirability principles is this: Although it is morally permissible
to do what one has a right to do, one can still be criticizable for doing it."'
Equally crucial to Audi's discussion is the distinction between subscriptive
and representative advocacy.
Representative advocacy is the kind appropriate for standing in for others, as a
lobbyist does; subscriptive advocacy is the kind appropriate to proposing a
public policy, as a concerned citizen does .... Actual motivation or belief is not
crucial to distinguishing representative from subscriptive advocacy: The lobbyist
could accept the cause represented, and the citizen could be lying. Thus,
representative and subscriptive advocacy are understood in terms of the
motivation and thrust appropriately attributable to them as carried out by the
advocate, rather than in terms of the advocate's actual convictions ....
"[S]ubscribe" is a psychological term, "subscriptive" a behavioral term.4
A lawyer arguing a client's cause is, of course, engaging in "representative"
advocacy. Such advocacy is conventionally assumed to be "impersonal, in the
34 ld. at 252.
35 Id.
36 id.
37 Id. at 263.
38 Id. at 257.
39 Id.
4 Id. Audi notes that this distinction is similar to the distinction, more familiar to lawyers,
between duty and aspiration. He also notes an important distinction - failure to meet
aspirational standards is not necessarily grounds for moral criticism, but failure to observe
desirability principles is always morally criticizable. Id at 257 n.6.
41 id. at 255.
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sense that one speaks from that point of view and not necessarily from
conviction." '42
The threshold constraints on both subscriptive and representative advocacy
derive from the fundamental moral requirements that we do no harm to others
and that we speak the truth.4' As might be expected, the constraints on
representative advocacy are somewhat less stringent than those on
subscriptive advocacy. In general, a representative advocate may argue all but
the most morally outrageous causes, like tyranny, for example. Moreover,
[olne may advocate an action that supports a cause which is on balance morally
wrong, provided there is an overriding moral reason for doing so - e.g., in
defending, as free expression, the legalization of public speeches by racist
groups (note that this rules out non-moral reasons, such as prudential ones, as
sufficient warrant) .... One may also advocate certain prima facie immoral
actions in defending a client one knows to be guilty, at least where what one
advocates is, or is essential to, just consideration of the case, as opposed to being
aimed at the client's acquittal regardless ofjustice. For the basis of the advocacy
here is a moral right to be effectively represented before the law."
Even representative advocates are constrained, however, by the threshold
"veracity" principle, which forbids lying and gross distortions. Even though
representative advocates do not purport to speak in their own voice, they can
still be guilty of falsehood when they purport to recount facts. Although
"certain uses of rhetoric or psychological manipulation to highlight evidence
and gain attention are permissible, even if often undesirable..., outright lying
and gross distortion of facts are prima facie ... criticizable." '45
Audi's "desirability" principles include the "evidential" principle, which
requires advocates to offer good, not specious reasons, and the related
"proportionality" principle, which requires advocates "to weight reasons they
offer for their position, in accord with their evidential force - e.g., not to
exaggerate the force of (and so disproportionately weight) the reasons. ' '" A
"good" reason "counts toward the truth of that position to a degree such that,
42 Id. Audi notes here the "principle of professional detachment under which a lawyer is
not to be regarded as endorsing the client's political, economic, social, or moral views." Id. at
255 n.5 (quoting Charles Wolfram, A Lawyer's Duty to Represent Clients, Repugnant or
Otherwise, in THE GOOD LAWYER 215 (David Luban ed., 1984)). Although a lawyer's efforts
on behalf of a client are unequivocally representative, the arguments in a scholarly article are
just as plainly subscriptive. The rhetoric of judicial opinions is more difficult to categorize.
Judges both "stand in" for the law (representative advocacy) and propose public policy
(subscriptive advocacy). This dual (or hybrid?) nature of judicial rhetoric is perhaps at the root
of its ethical ambiguity.
43 Id. at 258.
44 Id. at 259.
45 Id. at 259-60.
4 Id. at 263.
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if one had nothing else to go on, one would be minimally reasonable in
accepting the position on that basis." '47
Violations of the evidential and proportionality principles - such as
misleading, giving bad reasons, giving no reasons, presenting weak reasons
as strong - entail moral consequences.
[Such tactics] are a kind of manipulation which one should avoid using, even
when speaking in someone else's voice. Even if the cause is just, the
manipulative means used to promote it... lend themselves to promoting evil.
They are instruments of persuasion which, if unalloyed with evidence, affront
the dignity of the audience.'
But as important as the evidential principle is, there is, according to Audi,
a still stronger desirability principle - the "motivational" principle, which
holds that "if one is not motivated by a reason one gives, then using it
(evidentially) in advocating laws or policies is, apart from special
circumstances, prima facie reprehensible or at least undesirable. ' '49 Audi
provides five reasons why it is wrong for an advocate to give non-motivating
reasons. First, respect for persons demands that we do not ask someone else
to "stand on a ground we do not share."'  Second, Audi proposes a Kantian
consideration: "the moral status of one's motivating reason(s) affects that of
action rooted therein."'" Third, since advocacy (at least subscriptive
advocacy) is ordinarily both expressive of one's character and predictive of
future behavior, forthrightness is not served unless the motivational principle
is respected. 2 Fourth,
[e]ven if both advocate and audience take a non-motivating reason offered by
[the advocate] to be in the abstract good, at least one of them is not motivated by
it, and it is, in this respect, a weak social glue.. .. The... fragile agreement that
often results in such cases is not a reliable basis for social cooperation. 3
Finally, "if we have no preference for offering good reasons that motivate us
over those that do not, then our advocacy is not as fully in the service of...
truth as it might be."4
The motivational principle is more applicable to subscriptive than to
representative advocacy, because representative advocacy "carries a weaker
47 Id.
48 Id. at 264.
49 Id. at261.
50 Id.
51 id.
52 Id. at 262.
53 Id.
14 Id. at 263.
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presumption that one is moved by the reasons one gives."55  Where
representative advocacy is concerned, the very considerations that mandate the
motivational principle in subscriptive advocacy may on occasion generate
"overriders" for representative advocacy. Nonetheless, the motivational
principle has considerable application to representative advocacy; indeed, it
is "a constraint that operates except in special circumstances .... I Even in
representative advocacy, the audience presumes "that I am in any case not
offering reasons I do not take to be good - which would be an insult to them.
On their assumption, my giving non-motivating reasons will at least be
misleading as to my character and possibly my future conduct."57
The motivational principle applies with special force where
what is at stake is of such significance [e.g. liberty] that there seems to be
substantial reason for advocates to avoid adducing reasons that do not move
them .... On reflection, at least, we want the reasons people give to us for
major actions - say, for passing restrictive laws and policies - to be such that
they themselves are moved in the way they want us to be. There is a deficiency
in respect implied by asking someone to agree to something, especially to give
up a liberty, on a ground one at best abstractly appreciates and does not oneself
stand on.58
Finally,
the motivational principle has more force in some domains of advocacy than in
others. Legislators are heavily bound by it: Not only should the people be
treated with candor, but the reasons legislators give should both express their
character and provide a basis of reliable prediction of future behavior ..
However, lawyers representing their clients are understood to follow special
conventions of zealous representation .. "
In addition to the prima facie "desirability" of offering good and
"motivating" reasons, Audi also identifies specific desirability principles
applicable to the role responsibilities of advocates. Subscriptive advocates
should be consistent, e.g., "one should try to avoid advocating as legislator
something one would reject as citizen. ' "W Of course, such "role consistency
... may be impossible [for a representative advocate] to achieve," yet both
subscriptive and representative advocates should observe the principle of "role
I d. at 265.
I d. at 267.
7 Id
58 Id. at 267-68.
59 Id. at 269. Following Audi's reasoning, judges would appear to be as heavily bound by
the motivational principle as legislators - if not even more heavily bound, since judges, unlike
legislators, do not ordinarily serve at the people's pleasure.
60 1& at 270.
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hierarchy,"' deciding at a minimum which of their roles should prevail in case
of conflict. The moral basis for this prima facie obligation is the need for
consistency and for "moral integration." With regard to the latter, Audi
explains that
[i]t is both prudentially unwise and morally undesirable to be valuationally
fragmented.... A morally sound person has both a sense of moral priorities that
is not exhausted by any particular social role and a way of ordering prima facie
duties in relation to this sense.'
For Audi, the only role that can ever be "automatically morally dominant"
is that of moral agent. "Role ethics, as we might call it, is secondary to the
ethics of agency: the general ethical principles that apply to us all simply as
persons.'63 Thus, although role responsibilities create prima facie duties and
constraints for advocates, general moral responsibilities "should govern one's
resolution of role conflicts affecting advocacy."
In conclusion, it is worth noting that, like Wasserstrom, Audi sees criminal
defense as a distinct form of advocacy. Audi discusses at length the
application of his "evidential" and "motivational" principles to the criminal
defense lawyer. He suggests that the advocate's prima facie duty to "offer
only good, motivating reasons" may be overridden by "the accused's rights
to a fair trial with competent representation . . .." With respect to the
motivational principle in particular, he also suggests that the stakes in a
criminal trial may provide an overriding factor.
B. Background: Rhetoric
Broadly defined, "rhetoric is the art or the discipline that deals with the use
of discourse, either spoken or written, to inform or persuade or motivate an
audience...." Rhetoricians customarily narrow their concern, however, to
the discourse of persuasion, a focus implicit in such definitions of rhetoric as
"a means of so ordering discourse as to produce an effect on the listener or
reader,"67 or "the use of language as a symbolic means of inducing
cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols." Rhetoric in this
narrow sense is the advocate's medium of expression.
61 Id.
62 id.
63 id.
64 Id. at 271.
65 Jd. at 273.
66 CLASSICAL RHETORIC FOR THE MODERN STUDENT 1 (Edward P.J. Corbett & Robert i.
Connors eds., 4th ed. 1999) (hereinafter CORBErr].
67 Id. (quoting Marie Hochmuth Nichols).
Id. (quoting Kenneth Burke).
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Classical rhetoric identified three modes of persuasion: rational appeal
(logos), ethical appeal (ethos), and emotional appeal (pathos). Logos appeals
to the audience's rational faculties by providing it with sound deductive or
inductive arguments. It is buttressed by ethos, the character of the speaker as
evinced in the discourse itself. Even a convincing argument might prove futile
if the audience does not trust and esteem the speaker and believe in his or her
benevolence, candor, and intelligence. Finally, persuasion might require
pathos. Oftentimes the only way to sway an audience is to arouse its emotions,
to make it care about the outcome of an issue.
Some rhetoricians, like Aristotle himself, would like the discipline to
confine its persuasive methods to logos alone, believing that good reasons
provide the only pure grounds for decision-making. Robert Audi might
second this preference. His critique of advocacy is primarily a critique of
reasoning, and his conclusion is that advocacy "needs an ethic of reasons.""
To this, Wasserstrom might add that the rhetoric of law also needs an ethic of
ethos and pathos: because an advocate's words are for sale, there is special
cause to distrust the persona created in legal discourse and the emotional
appeals made. The role-differentiated behavior of lawyers puts their integrity
into greater question than that of other rhetoricians.
Because the rhetoric of law is so much a rhetoric of advocacy, it will only
have credibility if it also has an ethic."0 The following section tries to outline
an ethic of legal rhetoric by describing some of the practices in each mode of
persuasion that violate the duty of respect generally and Audi's threshold and
desirability principles in particular, and for which the exigencies of role
provide no sufficient excuse.
1. Logos (or an ethic of reasons)
Explanation is the primary way lawyers justify positions and decisions,
persuade audiences, and guide the administration of justice. Thus, as a
preliminary matter, an ethic of legal reason would require syllogistic or
enthymematic7' arguments to exhibit truthful premises and valid reasoning.
' See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
'0 We are not the first writers to perceive the ethical dimension of legal rhetoric. Richard
Weisberg's PoETmics (1992) makes a notable contribution. James Boyd White has also
considered, at least implicitly, the ethics of legal rhetoric, although to us at least, his faith in the
law as an on-going self-correcting democratic conversation is overly optimistic. See James
Boyd White, Judicial Criticism, 20 GA. L. REv. 835, 867 (1986).
71 The enthymeme is "the rhetorical equivalent of the syllogism" and more closely
resembles customary reasoning. It can be described as an "abbreviated syllogism - that is, an
argumentative statement that contains a conclusion and one of the premises, the other premise
being implied." CORBErr, supra note 66, at 53. When analyzing an enthymeme, one should
carefully articulate the implied premise since the weaknesses of the enthymeme may be hidden
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An argument may be misleading if it is based on false, implicit, or partial
premises, or on premises additional to or other than those offered. Offering
untruthful premises violates the first of Audi's threshold principles: Do not lie.
In legal rhetoric, it is a lie, for example, to rely upon authority that does not
stand for the proposition it is cited for72 or is not good law.73
Gross distortion and giving false impressions may also violate Audi's
threshold veracity principle because definitions of "lie" include statements
"intended or serving to convey a false impression."74 These violations are
encountered perhaps even more frequently than outright lies in legal rhetoric
because accepted standards of professional responsibility prohibit making
false statements, but not giving false impressions.75 Thus, lawyers usually
avoid making demonstrably untrue statements, but are more relaxed about
misleading their readers by implying what they know to be false.
To understand the rhetorical ploy of false inference, one must understand
first, the operation of inference, the means by which listeners understand what
speakers only imply. Central to this understanding are philosopher of
language H. P. Grice's theories of the Cooperative Principle and
"Implicature." Conversation, Grice says, is a cooperative endeavor that
succeeds because language users observe certain rules, rules Grice labels
"conversational maxims." The maxims are Quantity (the statement will be as
informative as required), Quality (the statement will be truthful and based on
sufficient evidence), Relation (the statement will be relevant), and Manner
(the statement will be clear and orderly). 76 When a statement seems to violate
one of these rules, its audience assumes the speaker has a reason for the
apparent violation and tries to infer that reason, to piece out the implicature,
the missing term that makes the statement consistent with the maxims and
therefore meaningful.
Assume, for example, that a sheriff pulls a driver over for speeding and
finds the driver's license has expired. The sheriff says, "I'm not going to
there, that is, the implied premise may be invalid. ld at 54.
' See Ursula Bentele's discussion of Justice Rehnquist's revisionist misreadings of
precedent in Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Eighth Amendment, and the Role of Precedent, 28 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 267, 286-95 (1991).
73 For example, in Division of Employment v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), Justice Scalia
cited Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), for the proposition that an
individual's religious beliefs do not excuse compliance with an otherwise valid law. Scalia
failed to mention, however, that Gobitis was nullified by West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
74 THE RANDOM HOUSE DICIONARY OF THE ENGUSH LANGUAGE 1109 (2d ed. 1987).
" For example, Rules 3.3 and 4.1 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct forbid
the knowing making of "a false statement of material fact or law."
76 H.P. Grice, Logic and Conversation, in 3 SYNTAXANDSEMANTICs 41,45-46 (Peter Cole
& Jerry L. Morgan eds., 1975).
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impound your car, but you are going to have to appear in court." The driver
responds, "Perhaps your son needs some new shoes." The driver's response
seems to violate the maxim of relation - it does not appear to be directly
relevant to the question asked. But a listener can construct the implicature:
The driver will grease the sheriff's palm if the court appearance could be
avoided.
Grice's analysis of conversational implicature illuminates our
understanding of false implicature, or false inference.
False inference is possible only because listeners and readers assume that
Grice's principles are being observed. Readers who assume, who trust, that a
writer observes Grice's maxims are open to inference and also vulnerable to
false inference. Trust, then, is a condition of both implicature and of false
implicature."
Violations of the trust upon which the cooperative principle depends are
unethical, particularly violations of the maxim of quality (do not say what is
false or that for which you lack evidence - conduct that is a per se moral
offense) and the maxim of relation (relevance).
We are able to infer correctly and imply with confidence because we provide the
suppressed premise or missing term that makes syllogisms of consecutive
statements, for instance. We should, then, judge exploitations of Grice's maxim
under Relation as unethical in any context because, as rational beings, we are
always vulnerable to false syllogism."'
An example of false implicature in the legal arena comes from a witness who
responds to the question, "Did you see Mr. Thomas shoot the officer?" with
"I was there, wasn't I?" The statement may be true but the implication that
"being there" is "seeing" the shooting may be false.
The ethical consequences of false implicature are sometimes mitigated
when the rhetorical situation is likely to reveal an implicature as false, as
respondent's brief may in the appellate context or scholarly critique in the
marketplace of ideas. In those situations, false implicature may be a violation
not of Audi's threshold principles but of Audi's desirability principles, which
govern morally permissible but criticizable behavior.
[11n judging the morality of a particular rhetorical means, we must do so within
a framework that focuses on the reader's presumed vulnerability to false
inference. Questions about what the reader can be presumed to know, whether
the reader has access to information, and what expectations are fostered by
external factors and by the immediate context in which the implicature appears
7 Arthur E. Walzer, The Ethics of False Implicature in Technical and Professional Writing
Courses, 19 J. TECH. WRrING &CoMM. 149,151, 153 (1989).
78 Id. at 155.
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will bear on our judgment of the reader's susceptibility and responsibility and
of the writer's culpability. 9
Yet, in the law, a reader may be vulnerable and a writer culpable even if the
rhetorical situation reveals an implicature as false. For example, lies and false
implicature in a judicial opinion, even if unmasked in a concurrence or
dissent, nonetheless bind the parties and the future. Rhetorical practices
merely undesirable in a litigator or scholar would thus appear to be
inexcusable on the bench.
If outright lying and false implicature violate Audi's threshold principles,
other rhetorical devices violate Audi's desirability principles. Central to
Audi's desirability principles are the evidential principle, which requires that
lawyers give reasons for their positions and that the reasons given are good
(i.e., provide a minimally reasonable basis for accepting the position), and the
proportionality principle, which requires that reasons be properly weighted
(their force not exaggerated). In classical rhetoric, violations of these
principles are violations of logos - they are ploys sufficiently manipulative
that they may promote evil even if the cause is just.
One violation of the evidential principle is the failure to provide reasons at
all. In legal rhetoric, ipse dixit statements, positions asserted without support,
but so forcefully as to discourage questioning or critique, are particularly
common examples of unsupported premises. 0
Faithfulness to the evidential and proportionality principles also requires
that we refrain from offering unsupported, implicit, or partial premises, or
premises resting on bases additional to or other than those offered since, in
logic, granting the premises often requires one to accept the conclusion. In
order to assess the soundness of an argument, in order not to be led astray by
a covert switch in grounds, the bases upon which premises rest need to be
identified, the reasons and evidence supporting those premises evaluated, and
the inferences drawn from the premises checked. Take, for example, the
premise "capital punishment deters crime." This premise seems to have an
empirical basis, for which we would expect statistical support. Sometimes,
however, expectations are thwarted, and an empirical premise is used to make
a normative argument. "Because capital punishment deters crime, it is good."
This assumes without proving not only the empirical truth of the deterrence
theory but the normative judgment that crime reduction and punishment
benefit society more than mercy and compassion. Both require support.
79 Id at 155-56.
so Holmes' dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), contains a famous ipse
dixit declaration: "This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the
country does not entertain." Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). The assertion is made so flatly
that disagreement is moot.
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This is especially true with enthymematic reasoning. One of the essential
differences between a syllogism and an enthymeme is that "a syllogism leads
to a necessary conclusion from universally true premises but the enthymeme
leads to a tentative conclusion from probable premises. In dealing with
contingent human affairs, we cannot always discover or confirm the truth."'"
We act on the basis of the merely probable or the probably right, 82 in the law
as well as in life.
Thus, misleading arguments stem not only from unsound premises, but
from inductive logical fallacies, like hasty conclusions,83 false analogies,"
or false dichotomies." One logical fallacy to which law is particularly
vulnerable is the normative fallacy: although the binding nature of enacted law
and the doctrine of stare decisis are often the sole justification in legal
argument, the sheer existence of a law or condition does not always justify the
law or condition, especially when reliance on authority avoids difficult issues
and has questionable results.8 6 Yet another common fallacy in legal argument
is the old chestnut known as "begging the question" - the premise assumes the
conclusion, rendering argument redundant.8 7  Finally, if authors
mischaracterize a position in order to knock it down, they have created
strawman arguments. Such arguments fail to defeat the true claim.
Even if an argument flows logically from or to a sound premise - and, thus,
provides a "good" reason - it is not necessarily an ethical argument. Of
SI CORBETr, supra note 66, at 53.
8 Consider the enthymeme: "John will fail his exams because he has not studied." The
truth of the minor premise - John has not studied - can be confirmed. The unstated premise is
only probable, however: One who does not study will fail. This is not universally true, though
its probability is likely and therefore persuasive. CORBETT, supra note 66, at 54.
83 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1634 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating
that "[b]ecause [homosexuals] reside in disproportionate numbers in certain communities...
and care about homosexual rights ardently.... they possess political power much greater than
their numbers").
84 See, e.g., Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219 (N.J. 1984). The New Jersey Supreme Court,
in imposing on social hosts liability for injuries caused by drunk drivers, falsely analogized
social hosts to liquor licensees and ignored the fact that, unlike bartenders, hosts often do not
serve guests and cannot assess intoxication. Id at 1224.
85 See, e.g., id (imposing liability on social hosts to compensate victims of drunk drivers
but neglecting to mention that victims already had a remedy against the intoxicated driver).
6 See, e.g., V.C. v. M.J.B., 725 A.2d 21 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (purportedly
applying the "best interests" test when a "psychological parent" seeks custody, but concluding
without comment that deference must be given to the statute's narrow definition of parent).
7 See Sutton v. United Airlines, 130 F.3d 893,903 (10th Cir. 1997) (plaintiffs cannot have
it both ways: they are either disabled under the Americans with Disabilities Act because their
uncorrected vision restricts the major life activity of seeing and thus renders them unqualified
as pilots, or they are qualified for that position because their vision is correctable and does not
interfere with a major life activity).
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equal, if not prime, importance is that speakers give the real reasons for their
conclusions, i.e., adhere to Audi's motivational principle. Under the
motivational principle, it is morally undesirable to offer reasons that do not
carry the conviction of the speaker, because motivating reasons show respect
for persons, effect the actions rooted in them, are expressive of character
(rhetoric's ethos), are predictive of future behavior, provide a basis for social
cooperation, and serve truth." Thus, lawyers should be candid about the real
reasons for their positions. They should not make arguments, for example,
that are motivated by normative (social and moral) principles but defended
only on grounds of authority. When public justification does not mirror
private conviction, an argument loses ethicity and credibility.
Legal realist Judge Robert A. Leflar wrote about this phenomenon in the
context of judicial opinions: "Often, neither formal logic nor interpretations
of prior precedent constitute real reasons either for moving the law in new
directions or for refusing to move it. The real reasons are apt to be socio-
economic or even political." '89 If a court fails to give its real reasons, there is
a good chance that not only will lawyers and other judges misinterpret the
meaning and scope of the decision - only to be rudely surprised by later
decisions that seem contrary to the court's stated justifications - but courts
will inevitably suffer a loss of integrity and credibility.' Thus, opinions
should be assessed for their honesty in this respect.9'
8 See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
8 Robert A. Leflar, Quality in Judicial Opinions, 3 PACE L.R. 579, 581 (1983).
9" Robert A. Leflar, Honest Judicial Opinions, 74 Nw. U. L. REv. 721, 741 (1979).
9' An interesting example of an opinion that seemingly violates Audi's motivational
principle is Braschi v. Stahl, 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989). To protect the adult life partner of
the deceased tenant of record fromeviction from a rent-controlled apartment, the court redefined
"family" to include those "whose relationship is long-term and characterized by an emotional
and financial commitment and interdependence." Braschi, 543 N.E.2d at 54. The court said
such a definition was justified by the reality of contemporary family life. Id. In other words,
it offered a social policy justification for its decision. To lawyers, Braschi was significant
because of the impact its redefinition of family could have on other areas of law: intestacy,
insurance, and adoption law, to name but a few. Yet, as the inevitable cases came up before the
New York Court of Appeals, it consistently refused to redefine family in any context other than
rent control. See, e.g., In re Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991) (holding that
the lesbian ex-life-partner of the biological mother had no standing to seek visitation with a
child jointly raised, because Alison D. was not a "parent" within the meaning of § 70 of New
York's Domestic Relations Law). Such a phenomenon suggests that the court was not in fact
prepared to accept new social configurations of family and did not give the real reasons for its
decision in Braschi. It is interesting to speculate why. One significant omission in the Braschi
decision is any mention of the fact the tenant of record died of AIDS (see Philip S. Gustis, New
York Court Defines Family to Include Homosexual Couples, N.Y. Times, July 7, 1989, at AI)
and that eviction might render homeless his life partner, a man quite possibly at risk of AIDS
himself. Given this possibility, one could speculate that compassion motivated the Braschi
result rather than social policy, but that the court was uncomfortable resting its decision upon
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2. Ethos
The ethical appeal gains importance when an argument deals with an issue
about which certainty is unlikely and opinion divided. In this situation, an
audience's position might be influenced by its assessment of the speaker's
character, or "persona," as it is revealed in discourse. Classical rhetoricians
tried in particular to exhibit good judgment, moral character, and
benevolence.92 Good sense is manifest in discourse when a person
demonstrates a good grasp of the subject matter, logical reasoning, appropriate
perspective, and good taste. High moral character requires exhibiting respect
for communal values, disdain for unscrupulous tactics, and unwavering
personal integrity. Good will is demonstrated by showing open-mindedness
and a sincere concern for the audience's well-being.'
Creating a persona is complicated, because it is revealed in every
characterization, as James Boyd White points out in his discussion of the
persona of the court.
In rhetorical terms, the court gives itself an ethos, or character, and does the
same both for the parties to a case and for the larger audience it addresses - the
lawyers, the public, and the other agencies in government. It creates by
performance it own character and role and establishes a community with others.
... It is here that we can find its values most fully defined and realized."
The persona of the court, like that of any author, is revealed in the tone of
voice the author adopts and the attitudes the author assumes toward materials
and sources, the content of the text, and the parties involved.95
such grounds. The court's less than candid reasoning made it impossible to predict its future
actions, resulting in a flood of pointless litigation and disappointed hopes. Even well-
intentioned violations of the motivational principle, then, entail bad consequences. When
judges write "dishonest" opinions, predictability suffers, as in Braschi. In addition, truth
suffers, as does the cohesion between court and counsel, governing and governed.
92 CORBETT, supra note 66, at 73.
93 Id.
94 White, supra note 70, at 846.
91 Robert L. Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as Literary Genre, 2 YAL J. L. & HUMAN.
201 (1990). Robert L. Ferguson describes the judicial persona as revealed in opinions as having
four principal traits: first, a monologic voice, id. at 207 (a single, seemingly disinterested voice
that appears "as if forced to its inevitable conclusion by the logic of the situation and the duties
of office"); second, an interrogative mode, id. at 208-10 (the power to frame the question that
is to be answered and thus to render it rhetorical in scope); third, a declarative tone, id. at 213
(resisting mystery and complexity by using "hyperbole, certitude, assertion, simplification, and
abstraction"); and finally, a rhetoric of inevitability, id. at 214 (the association of the judge's
view with the correct course in history).
The judge Ferguson describes is akin to James Boyd White's description of the "boss"
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The difficulty in maintaining a consistently admirable and attractive
persona makes exploitation of ethos difficult. Inauthenticity can be revealed
by a single lapse, jeopardizing the entire effect of the ethical appeal. Hidden
agendas, biases, unfounded assumptions, elitism have a way of rising to the
surface. Notes of peevishness, pettiness, malevolence, vulgarity, arrogance
are sounded by the use of nit-picking strategies, pejorative language,
stereotypical depiction, exaggeration, inappropriate jocularity, sarcasm, and
imperiousness. Judicial humor, for example, undercuts a court's ethos when
it is misplaced. A dissonant display of bad taste and bad judgment occurred
in Davis v. United States, where a sailor was savagely beaten to death after a
game of pool. Inexplicably finding this an occasion for humor, Justice
O'Connor begins "Pool brought trouble - not to River City, but to the
Charleston Naval Base."96
3. Pathos
Emotional appeal plays a role in the persuasive process because of the vital
impact it has on our intellectual convictions and our will to act. There is
nothing reprehensible about this fusion unless the appeal prompts behavior or
arouses feelings that a reasonable person would later regret.
Classical rhetoric singles out two types of appeal that are apt to induce
shame: Ad populem and ad hominem arguments, both of which attempt to
divert the audience from the issue at hand by exciting emotions and
anesthetizing rational faculties. Such tactics show a disrespect for persons
that is offensive to a universalist morality. An argument adpopulem invokes
irrational fears and biases, as illustrated by the prejudicial remarks of the
defense in the trial of Bernhard Goetz, who shot four black teenagers on a
New York subway. Defense counsel played on racial fears, describing the
complainants as the "gang of four," as "predators" on society, and as "vultures
and savages." Ad hominem arguments are arguments directed at a person
judge, who declares "the meaning of an authoritative text" in a voice itself "authoritative,
unquestioning, and unquestionable." White, supra note 70, at 855-56. Yet, White also
recognizes another judicial persona - ajudge who justifies a decision by expounding on the text
and respecting the readers' intelligence and discernment. With this type of judge, "the
individual and the community alike (engage] in a continual process of education, of intellectual
and moral self-improvement ..." Id. at 867.
96 512 U.S. 452, 454 (1994).
97 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE 206 (1990). Not even the more
permissive ethical standards arguably appropriate to criminal defense can encompass conduct,
like racist rhetoric, that breaches the threshold principle "Do no harm." In contrast, appeals to
pathos would seem ethical when they speak to our higher feelings. For example, Human Rights
Watch petitioned a British court not to release General Augusto Pinochet on grounds of
unfitness to stand trial, arguing inter alia "Of particular concern is whether the evidence shows
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rather than at the issue. Intellectual competitiveness renders legal scholars
prone to the ad hominem trap, even though ad hominem argument rarely
enhances an author's ethos.98
II. THE FATE OF MIRANDA: A RHETORICAL MICROCOSM
A. Judicial Rhetoric: United States v. Dickerson
The majority opinion of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in United
States v. Dickerson" is judicial rhetoric at its most disrespectful. Arguments
grounded in logos, pathos, and ethos alike too often lack candor and deal
roughly with opposing views and their proponents. Indeed, with respect to
defense, prosecution, dissent, and audience at large, the opinion manifests the
"contempt, mockery, disdain, [and] detraction '' "° that Kant urges us to avoid.
The court repeatedly violates Audi's evidential, proportional, and motivational
principles and comes very close to violating his threshold "veracity" principle.
These ethical shortcomings are all the more inexcusable because the advocacy
of judicial opinions is at least partially subscriptive advocacy.' In sum, the
inappropriate use of the role-differentiated rhetoric of the adversary system in
Dickerson is not only disrespectful, but, ultimately, productive of disrespect.
Analyzing the rhetoric of the majority opinion in Dickerson puts us,
uncomfortably, in two places at once: outside legal rhetoric but, inevitably,
inside it as well. We are tempted to argue (as we both believe) that the Fourth
Circuit is dead wrong,"° to argue that Miranda's constitutional status is
demonstrated not only textually, but also by the Supreme Court's continued
application of Miranda to controversies arising out of state prosecutions and
not merely that Pinochet is a sick, old man - afate to which many of Pinochet's victims would
have gladly aspired - but, as British law requires, that he is incapable of understanding the
proceedings against him and of assisting in his own defense." Court Order Sought on Pinochet
Medical Judgment: Decision Must Not be Rushed or Secret, Human Rights Watch Press
Release, Jan. 24,2000, http:lwww.hrw.orglpress/2000/01/pinoO124.htm (emphasis added).
98 See, for example, Martha Nussbaum's "adfeminem" attack on Judith Butler in The
Professor of Parody, THE NEW REPUBUC, Feb. 22, 1999, at 37.
99 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir.), rev'd, Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000)
[hereinafter Dickerson Ill.
100 ODORA O'NEILL, CONSTRUCTION OF REASON: EXPLORATIONS OF KANT'S PRACTICAL
PHILOSOPHY 115 (1991).
102 See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
102 The temptation is all the keener because one of us for many years briefed and argued
appeals for indigents convicted of crimes. The rhetoric of role often long outlasts the role.
Thus, although we have aimed for respectful rhetoric, we apologize for having probably
committed some of the very abuses we decry.
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to federal habeas corpus proceedings. 10 3 The further temptation is to argue in
no uncertain terms, using the traditional legal rhetorical strategies. We try to
be mindful in what follows that our enterprise is not to convince the reader
that the wrong decision was made but, rather, to see whether the decision was
wrongly made.
The disrespectful rhetoric of Dickerson is all the more disturbing because
of its major target. Whether Miranda is constitutional, sub-constitutional, or
non-constitutional; whether it has had a good, bad, or unknowable effect on
law enforcement, criminal justice, or crime rates -one thing seems certain: the
Warren court's decision is explicitly grounded in an ethic of universal respect.
Discussing the development of the privilege against self-incrimination, Chief
Justice Warren writes that all the policies supporting the privilege "point to
one overriding thought: the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege
is the respect a government - state or federal - must accord to the dignity and
integrity of its citizens."" Moreover, the rhetoric of Miranda is itself
informed by this principle. The opinion is characterized by careful
explanation and respect for the views of others. Ironically, it is the Court's
respect for the views and autonomy of others (suggesting that Congress and
the states might find still better ways to protect the guarantee against
compelled self-incrimination) that invited much of the Fourth Circuit's
argument in Dickerson.
1. Statement of the case
On the merits, Dickerson was a decision waiting to happen: it was just a
matter of time until a federal court with a conservative cast of mind0 5 ruled
that Miranda v. Arizona"° is dead, having been nullified by 18 U.S.C. §
3501,"0' enacted by Congress in 1968. Although that statute itself was widely
103 See, e.g., Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993) (federal habeas); New York v.
Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (state case). Indeed, Miranda itself is a state case, and it is
difficult to imagine on what basis other than constitutional interpretation the Court would
presume to pass on the rights of criminal defendants prosecuted under state law.
'04 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460.
105 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is such a court. The New York
Times calls it, "the country's most self-confident, activist, conservative court." Roger Parloff,
Miranda on the Hot Seat, N.Y. TIMEs MAG., Sept. 26, 1999, at 84, 85.
'06 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
107 Section 3501 provides in pertinent part as follows.
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the District of
Columbia, a confession, as defined in subsection (e) hereof, shall be admissible in
evidence if it is voluntarily given. Before such confession is received in evidence, the trial
judge shall, out of the presence of the jury, determine any issues as to voluntariness ....
(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into consideration
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considered - most notably by Federal prosecutors - to be a dead letter, an
unconstitutional abrogation of Supreme Court precedent, dedicated amici had
long been urging the federal courts to perform sua sponte judicial review of
§ 3501008 It was this challenge that the Fourth Circuit took up in Dickerson,
ruling, as urged, that the rules set out in Miranda are not required by the
Constitution, and that therefore § 3501 is constitutional and in full force,
because the statute does no more than overrule judicially created rules of
evidence and procedure.1"
Dickerson is factually and procedurally complex. By the Fourth Circuit's
account, the robber of an Alexandria, Virginia, bank was driven from the
scene in a car registered to Dickerson. Taken into custody, Dickerson told the
FBI Agents that he drove a distant relative named Jimmy Rochester to and
from a location near the bank. Rochester was arrested and confessed,
implicating Dickerson as his driver. A search of Dickerson's apartment and
car produced substantial incriminating evidence, including a handgun and
leather bag like those used in the robberies, masks, dye-stained money and a
"bait bill" from the robberies, and solvent used to clean dye-stained money. 10
Indicted on several counts of bank robbery, Dickerson moved to suppress
his confession on the ground that he was not timely given his Miranda
warnings and to suppress items of evidence on the ground that they were,
variously, the result of the Miranda violation and of a defective search
warrant. After a hearing, the District Court suppressed Dickerson's
confession on Miranda grounds, believing Dickerson's account and
all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, including
(1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the
confession, if it was made after arrest and before arraignment,
(2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense with which he was
charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making the confession,
(3) whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he was not required
to make any statement and that any such statement could be used against him,
(4) whether or not such defendant had been advised prior to questioning of his
right to the assistance of counsel when questioned and when giving such confession.
The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to be taken into consideration
by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession.
~ Paul G. Cassell has been particularly central to this struggle. Cassell is a former law clerk
of Antonin Scalia (when Justice Scalia was a Federal Appeals Court Judge) and a former
prosecutor in the Fourth Circuit. He has written numerous articles calling for the overruling of
Miranda. He frequently works with two conservative public interest groups, the Washington
Legal Foundation and the Safe Streets Coalition, and has written amicus briefs urging this
Miranda agenda, notably those in Dickerson. See Parloff, supra note 105. When the
Department of Justice declined to brief and argue Dickerson in the Supreme Court, Cassell was
invited by the Court to argue in favor of § 3501.
'09 Dickerson l1, 166 F.3d at 672.
Ito Id. at 674.
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disbelieving that of the FBI agent who questioned him. The District Court
declined to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the confession (his co-
defendant's statement implicating Dickerson), however, holding that although
Dickerson's confession was obtained in violation of Miranda, it was voluntary
within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and
therefore its fruits were admissible. It also declined to suppress evidence
found in the trunk of Dickerson's car." But the court did suppress evidence
found at Dickerson's apartment, finding that the warrant was, inter alia,
insufficiently particular in describing the items to be seized.
The government thereupon asked the District Court to reconsider its
suppression order, seeking to introduce further (though not newly discovered)
evidence concerning the timing of the Miranda warnings and asking in the
alternative that Dickerson's statement be admitted under 18 U.S.C. § 3501,
which by its terms admits into evidence in Federal Court confessions deemed
"voluntary" albeit in violation of Miranda."2
The District Court declined to reconsider its previous order,"3 and the
government appealed to the Fourth Circuit, arguing both that the District
Court should have reopened the Miranda hearing and that the suppression of
tangible evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds was erroneous. On this
appeal, the government did not brief or argue the § 3501 issue, but an amicus
brief was filed by the Washington Legal Foundation and Safe Streets
Coalition urging the Fourth Circuit to hold sua sponte that Dickerson's
confession was voluntary within the meaning of § 3501.
.. Id. at 676.
112 Id.
"1 United States v. Dickerson, 971 F. Supp. 1023 (E.D. Va. 1997) [hereinafter Dickerson
1]. The District Court's opinion did not address the § 3501 issue, possibly because the
government declined to argue that point. The court was openly critical of the government's
attempts to re-open the suppression hearing. The judge criticized the prosecution's preparation,
observing at the hearing that "this is one of those deals where they threw the case at [the AUSA]
at 4:00 on the day before [the hearing]." Id. at 1023, 1024 n.2. Moreover, the court concluded
that at least some of the evidence that the prosecution sought to add to its case in fact
corroborated Dickerson's testimony and not that of the FBI agent. Fimally, the court was no
more receptive to the government's rhetoric than to its affidavits, as follows:
The government begins its plea for reconsideration by asserting that "at stake here is not
only our ability to bring Dickerson to book for multiple armed robberies but also quite
possibly an agent's career." More correctly, what is at stake here is the liberty of a citizen
who is presumed to be innocent and whose constitutionally protected rights were
breached by the government. At the end of the day, and regardless of the outcome of the
trial of this case, Agent Lawler will not spend the next several years in prison - Dickerson
may.
Id. at 1025 n.4.
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Deciding that it had the power to review the denial of reconsideration 4 and
that the standard of review was "abuse of discretion,""' 5 the Fourth Circuit
concluded that the hearing judge did not abuse his discretion when he refused
to allow the government to supplement its Miranda case.' 16 The appellate
court nonetheless reversed the order suppressing Dickerson's confession,
ruling that it had the power to consider the Miranda I § 3501 issue sua sponte;
that § 3501 is constitutional and supersedes Miranda;7 and that, since
§ 3501 requires only a finding of traditional "voluntariness," and the district
court had already held the confession to be voluntary, no remand for
application of the statute was required.118 The Fourth Circuit also reversed the
order of the District Court suppressing tangible evidence on Fourth
Amendment grounds.
2. Rhetorical analysis
The majority opinion in Dickerson is long: twenty-four pages in the Federal
Reporter. The structure of the opinion itself makes plain that despite the half
dozen or so issues presented, Dickerson has one and only one real point:
§ 3501 controls. Thus, the opinion begins not with the usual introduction of
parties and issues, but with a paragraph in which the court summarizes its
§ 3501/Miranda argument. It continues with a longer summary of the § 3501
argument in Section I. In Section IlI, the court provides a lengthy analysis
of the issue.
a. Opening paragraph
The opening paragraph is set out in full below because it introduces not
only the court's conclusion that § 3501 supersedes Miranda, but also
introduces several of the court's most disrespectful rhetorical strategies: false
implicature, omission, insincerity, hyperbole verging on deceit, and sneering
sarcasm directed at the holders of opposing views.
In response to the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed.2d 694 (1966), the Congress of the United States
enacted 18 U.S.C.A. § 3501 (West 1985), with the clear intent of restoring
voluntariness as the test for admitting confessions in federal court. Although
duly enacted by the United States Congress and signed into law by the President
of the United States, the United States Department of Justice has steadfastly
n4 Id. at 678 n.10.
"I Id. at 678.
116 Id. at 680.
"7 Id. at 692.
" Id. at 692-93.
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refused to enforce the provision. "9 In fact, after initially "taking the Fifth" on
the statute's constitutionality, the Department of Justice has now asserted,
without explanation, that the provision is unconstitutional. With the issue
squarely presented, we hold that Congress, pursuant to its power to establish the
rules of evidence and procedure in the federal courts, acted well within its
authority in enacting § 3501. As a consequence, § 3501, rather than Miranda,
governs the admissibility of confessions in federal court. Accordingly, the
district court erred in suppressing Dickerson's voluntary confession on the
grounds that it was obtained in technical violation of Miranda.'20
If readers are to be convinced that the court's holding that § 3501
supersedes Miranda is correct, they must be convinced of two things: that it
is appropriate for the court to decide the issue sua sponte and that Miranda is
not grounded in the Constitution. These issues are the very heart of the matter
- but in the opening paragraph they are, respectively, misrepresented and
omitted.
First, the reader is led to assume, incorrectly, that the § 3501/Miranda issue
was raised on appeal by the government. The court's statement "the
Department of Justice has now asserted . . . that [§ 3501] is
unconstitutional,"'' followed by its assurance that "the issue [is] squarely
presented"'2 is an instance of false implicature exploiting the reader's
expectation that utterances will be rationally related to each other.. In fact, the
government's assertion was not made in the course of the proceedings in
Dickerson, not, indeed, in the course of any proceeding before the court. 123
"With the issue squarely presented" is thus a non-sequitur with respect to
whatever assertions the government may have made. And since neither side
raised § 3501 before the Fourth Circuit, it is simply not true that the issue was
"squarely presented."
Second, the substantive question at the heart of the § 3501/Miranda
question - the constitutional status of Miranda - is simply absent from the
opening paragraph. The question as framed by the court is no more than a
shadow cast by the real question. Indeed, the shadow question is not even
explicitly framed - the reader must reconstruct it from the court's conclusion
"that Congress, pursuant to its power to establish the rules of evidence and
procedure in the federal courts, acted well within its authority in enacting
"9 The dangling modifier in this sentence would bother some readers.
120 Dickerson 11, 166 F.3d at 671.
121 id.
122 id.
123 In fact, it was made in a letter from Attorney General Janet Reno to Congress dated
September 10, 1997. Id. at 672.
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§ 3501."'" The court's conclusion contains an enthymeme that, elaborated,
holds as follows.
Major Premise: Congress may establish the rules of evidence and
procedure in the federal courts.
Implied Premise: Section 3501 is a rule of evidence or procedure.
Conclusion: Congress acted within its authority in enacting § 3501.
Yet this "proof" demonstrates nothing. The real Miranda I § 3501 question
concerns what Congress may not do. The major premise is more properly:
"Congress may not overturn decisions of the Supreme Court interpreting the
Constitution." But in the opening paragraph of Dickerson, the Constitution
is just negative space - present only in the government's purportedly
unexplained assertion of § 3501's "unconstitutionality" and in the derisive
expression "taking the Fifth.' 25 Although in the body of the opinion, the
Dickerson majority does eventually, albeit less than candidly, discuss at length
both the appropriateness of its sua sponte decision and the constitutional
status of Miranda, its misleading and evasive opening may nonetheless
deceive a busy or novice reader.
The hyperbole that is the stylistic signature of Dickerson (and present in
quite a few otherjudicial opinions) is already much in evidence in the opening
paragraph. Congress has not just the "intent" of restoring pre-Miranda law,
it has the "clear intent."' The statute was not only "enacted," it was "duly"
enacted. 27 The Department of Justice has "steadfastly" refused to apply
§ 3501. The issue is "squarely" presented.' Congress acted "well" within
its authority.'29 In contrast to all this magnification, the Miranda violation
found by the District Court is reduced in scale to a mere "technical"
violation. 3°
In addition to misleading, concealing, and exaggerating - rhetorical
excesses going to logos - the opening paragraph of Dickerson makes an
appeal going to pathos as well. The court argues ad hominem, impugning the
probity and competence of the Department of Justice. First, the reader is led
124 Id at 671.
125 id
126 id.
127 idL
128 i
129 Id. Justice Scalia's dissent in Dickerson III is similarly hyperbolic: "the decision in
Miranda, if read as an explication of what the Constitution requires is preposterous," Dickerson
11, 120 S. Ct. 2339; the elimination of compulsion "cannot conceivably require the right to have
counsel present," id.; the court "flagrantly offends fundamental principles of separation of
powers .... Id. at 2342.
130 Dickerson 11, 166 F.3d at 671.
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to question the motivation and competence of lawyers who refuse to enforce
a statute that is all that a federal statute should be - "[DIuly enacted by the
United States Congress and signed into law by the President of the United
States." But there is worse: the government has been "taking the Fifth" on
§ 3501. In other words, like the criminal defendants it should be prosecuting,
the Department of Justice is hiding its guilty secret behind that great
obstruction to law and order, the Constitution.
The locution "taking the Fifth" thus reveals the Court's contempt not only
for the prosecution, but also for the privilege at the heart of the
Mirandal§ 3501 debate. The guarantee against compelled self-incrimination
contained in the Fifth Amendment is mentioned very rarely in Dickerson - and
its first and most prominent mention is here, in a sarcastic epithet more
appropriate in a police precinct or tabloid newspaper than in ajudicial opinion
and, therefore, a breach of the court's ethos. The rhetorical strategy backfires,
however, allowing the reader to glimpse another reason, perhaps the "real"
reason, for the court's decision: a political agenda that privileges law
enforcement over individual rights. The court's ostensible reason for
concluding that § 3501 supersedes Miranda - Congress's "power to establish
the rules of evidence and procedure in the federal courts" - though given
much lip service, may not in fact motivate the court's own belief. These
violations of Audi's motivational, evidential, and proportional principles will
become clearer still in the rest of the opinion.
b. Section I
Insincerity, misdirection, omission, gross exaggeration, contempt - the
opening paragraph of Dickerson provides a sampling of the majority's
rhetorical excesses."' Section I of the opinion, which summarizes the history
of § 3501 and the court's analysis of the Miranda I § 3501 issue, continues
these strategies. Much of it is reprinted here, with line numbers to facilitate
reference; citations are omitted.
In ruling on the admissibility of Dickerson's confession, the district court
failed to consider § 3501, which provides, in pertinent part, that "a confession
... shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given." 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3501(a). Based upon the statutory language, it is evident that Congress
5 enacted § 3501 with the express purpose of legislatively overruling Miranda and
restoring voluntariness as the test for admitting confessions in federal court.
131 Compare this with the exaggeration and contempt of the Supreme Court dissent.
"Today's judgment converts Miranda from a milestone of judicial overreaching into the very
Cheops' Pyramid (or perhaps the Sphinx would be a better analogue) of judicial arrogance."
Dickerson III, 120 S. Ct. at 2348 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Although this is spirited dissent, to
some (ourselves included) its assertion of intellectual superiority is offensive.
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Thus, if Congress possessed the authority to enact § 3501, Dickerson's voluntary
confession is admissible as substantive evidence in the Government's case-in-
chief.
10 Congress enacted § 3501 as a part of the Omnibus Crime control Act of 1968,
just two years after the Supreme Court decided Miranda. Although the Supreme
Court has referred to § 3501 as "the statute governing the admissibility of
confessions in federal prosecutions," the Court has never considered whether the
statute overruled Miranda. Indeed, although several lower courts have found
15 that § 3501, rather than Miranda, governs the admissibility of confessions in
federal court, no Administration since the provision's enactment has pressed the
point. In fact, after initially declining to take a position on the applicability of
§ 3501, the current Administration has now asserted, without explanation, that
the provision is unconstitutional.
20 Recently, Justice Scalia expressed his concern with the Department of
Justice's failure to enforce § 3501. In addition to"caus[ing] the federal judiciary
to confront a host of 'Miranda' issues that might be entirely irrelevant under
federal law," Justice Scalia noted that the Department of Justice's failure to
invoke the provision "may have produced - during an era of intense national
25 concern about the problem of run-away crime - the acquittal and the
nonprosecution of many dangerous felons." This is just such a case. Dickerson
voluntarily confessed to participating in a series of armed bank robberies.
Without his confession it is possible, if not probable, that he will be acquitted.
Despite that fact, the Department of Justice, elevating politics over law,
30 prohibited the U.S. Attorney's Office from arguing that Dickerson's confession
is admissible under the mandate of § 3501.
Fortunately, we are a court of law and not politics. Thus, the Department of
Justice cannot prevent us from deciding this case under the governing law simply
by refusing to argue it. Here, the district court has suppressed a confession that,
35 on its face, is admissible under the mandate of § 3501, i.e., the confession was
voluntary under the Due Process Clause, but obtained in technical violation of
Miranda. Thus, the question of whether § 3501 governs the admissibility of
confessions in federal court is squarely before us today.
In its historical precis (lines 10-26), the court cites Justice Scalia's concern,
expressed in a 1994 concurrence, over the non-enforcement of § 3501. His
suggestion that non-enforcement "may have produced - during an era of
intense national concern about the problem of run-away crime - the acquittal
and the non-prosecution of many dangerous felons"13 2 appeals to the
audience's fear of violent crime (an ad populem argument from pathos).,13
132 Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 465 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring).
133 Although the Court's reaffirmance of Miranda's constitutionality may be arguable, it is
not so patently wrong as to merit Justice Scalia's doomsday ad populum argument in his
dissent. "[T]o justify today's agreed-upon result, the Court must adopt a significant new, if not
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The Fourth Circuit exploits this fear, noting (lines 26-28) "This is just such a
case. Dickerson voluntarily confessed to participating in a series of armed
bank robberies. Without his confession it is possible, if not probable, that he
will be acquitted."'3'
Like most ad populem arguments, this one contains a considerable
overstatement: Dickerson is indeed not "just such a case." There appears to
be a great deal of evidence of guilt other than Dickerson's confession, if
indeed his statement can be fairly characterized as such.a 5 A bank robber was
seen leaving the scene of the crime as a passenger in Dickerson's car.
Tangible evidence was found in Dickerson's apartment and car - a gun and
leather bag described by eye-witnesses, marked money, and the fluid used to
clean marked money. The actual robber confessed, implicating Dickerson.136
Finally, should Dickerson try to explain away the evidence, his statement can
be used to impeach his credibility.137
Accusing the Department of Justice of condoning the non-prosecution of
violent felons (an ad hominem argument), the court inadvertently allows the
reader to glimpse motivating reasons for its decision that are only obliquely
entirely comprehensible, principle of constitutional law... [namely] that this Court has the
power, not merely to apply the Constitution but to expand it .... That is an immense and
frightening antidemocratic power, and it does not exist." Dickerson 111, 120 S. Ct. at 2337
(Scalia, J., dissenting). In contrast, Rehnquist seeks to quell any anxiety that reaffirmance might
produce.
The disadvantage of the Miranda rule is that statements which may be by no means
involuntary. .. may nonetheless be excluded and a guilty defendant go free as a result.
But experience suggests that the totality-of-circumstances test which § 3501 seeks to
revive is more difficult than Miranda for law enforcement officers to conform to, and for
courts to apply in a consistent manner ....
Id. at 2336.
'3 Dickerson 11, 166 F.3d at 672 (emphasis added). When the court writes "it is possible,
if not probable, that he will be acquitted," id., it is exploiting semantic ambiguity. "Possible,
if not probable" has two distinct, lexical meanings: "not just possible, but probable" and
"possible, even though not probable." The latter would appear correct in light of the evidence,
but the court's hyperbole "just such a case" presses the reader in the direction of the first
meaning.
135 Dickerson "confessed" to transporting a relative with a criminal record to and from the
vicinity of a bank. Appellee's Petition for Rehearing and Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 2-3,
Dickerson 11, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999) (No. 97-4750), rev'd, Dickerson III, 120 S. Ct. 2326
(2000) [hereinafter Appellee's Petition for Rehearing]. It is not clear what, if anything, he said
about other bank robberies. The statement of facts in Dickerson's brief in opposition to en banc
review seems to suggest that Dickerson's only statement concerned driving his disreputable
relative on one occasion.
136 Dickerson 11, 166 F.3d at 673-74.
," See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224-25 (1971) (holding that a statement taken in
violation of Miranda maybe used to impeach a testifying defendant's credibility if the statement
is found to be voluntary).
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acknowledged (lines 29-34). As in the epithet "taking the Fifth," the Court's
hyperbolic abuse of pathos here suggests that the politics of law and order, not
the ordained roles ofjudiciary and legislature, is what really drives Dickerson.
In the same passage (lines 29-34), the court attempts to secure the ethical
high ground for itself, accusing the Department of Justice of "elevating
politics over law" in its refusal to argue § 3501, adding, "[Flortunately, we are
a court of law and not politics. Thus, the Department of Justice cannot
prevent us from deciding this case under the governing law simply by refusing
to argue it." The court's attempt to argue its own stalwart ("cannot prevent
us") independence ("court of law and not politics") rings hollow. First, it sets
up a false dichotomy: there are, of course, no courts of politics.'38 Second, in
light of the court's explicit concern with securing convictions, it appears that
the court does indeed have its own political agenda and is merely engaging in
the disingenuous, if standard, rhetorical ploy of calling those with opposing
views "political."
Portraying itself as the impartial champion of the rule of law, the Fourth
Circuit is creating a persona, making an argument from ethos that is no less
inappropriate for being a convention of the judicial opinion.139 Some may
object to this critique of the court's rhetoric by arguing that no harm is done,
or even some good, by the apolitical pose: first, it is the rare person who
believes that judges do not take their political convictions to the bench with
them; ° second, the fiction gives non-majoritarian decision-making the
appearance of legitimacy; third, as a practical matter, the pretense of
impartiality may indeed operate as a constraint on partiality.
Yet, on balance, the mantle of impartiality nonetheless seems to us a
disturbing rhetorical strategy better done without. Claiming complete
131 Justice Scalia creates a false "them-us" dichotomy at the outset of his dissent in
Dickerson III.
Those to whom judicial decisions are an unconnected series of judgments that produce
either favored or disfavored results will doubtless greet today's decision as a paragon of
moderation, since it declines to overrule Miranda v. Arizona.... Those who understand
the judicial process will appreciate that today's decision is not a reaffirmation of Miranda,
but a radical revision of the most significant element of Miranda (as of all cases): the
rationale that gives it a permanent place in our jurisprudence.
Id at 2337 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Like the Fourth Circuit's rhetorical ploy, Justice Scalia's
attempt to monopolize the ethical high ground fails: no member of the legal community believes
that judicial decisions are "unconnected."
139 See Ferguson, supra note 95.
14 Journalists routinely discuss the political predilections ofjudges. For example, The New
York Times has reported that the Fourth Circuit is known as a"model of conservative pursuits."
Neil A. Lewis, A Court Becomes a Model of Conservative Pursuits, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1999,
at Al, A22. "It's gotten to the point that if there is a 2-to-I liberal panel decision, you can
predict with almost 'perfect' certainty it will go before the full court and be reversed. Liberal
panel decisions are not allowed to survive." Id.
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neutrality, even to an audience who knows it to be untrue, almost always
entails undesirable consequences in addition to the disrespect inherent in
untruthfulness. As Wasserstrom suggests, the law's dependence on language
imposes a higher standard for its use and graver consequence for
transgressions. Whenjudges utter an obvious untruth, their integrity and thus,
their authority become suspect, even when the untruth is a conventional one.
Having attempted to gain the reader's good opinion, the Fourth Circuit
summarizes its Miranda I§ 3501 argument, over-simplifying and distorting.
Determining whether Congress possesses the authority to enact § 3501 is
relatively straightforward. Congress has the power to overrulejudicially created
rules of evidence and procedure that are not required by the Constitution. Thus,
whether Congress has the authority to enact § 3501 turns on whether the rule set
5 forth by the Supreme Court in Miranda is required by the Constitution. Clearly
it is not. At no point did the Supreme Court in Miranda refer to the warnings as
constitutional rights. Indeed, the Court acknowledged that the Constitution did
not require the warnings, disclaimed any intent to create a "constitutional
straightjacket," referred to the warnings as "procedural safe-guards," and invited
10 Congress and the States "to develop their own safeguards for [protecting] the
privilege." Since deciding Miranda, the Supreme Court has consistently referred
to the Miranda warnings as "prophylactic," and "not themselves rights protected
by the Constitution." We have little difficulty concluding, therefore, that § 3501,
enacted at the invitation of the Supreme Court and pursuant to Congress's
15 unquestioned power to establish the rules of procedure and evidence in the
federal courts. . ., is governed by § 3501, rather than the judicially created rule
of Miranda.'
Nothing could be clearer than the court's argument here. The text has perfect
surface cohesion, proceeding in the promised "straightforward" fashion: a
model of linearity.
Major Premise: "Congress has the power to overrule judicially created
rules of evidence and procedure that are not required
by the Constitution."
Minor Premise: "[T]he rule set forth by the Supreme Court in Miranda
is [clearly not] required by the Constitution."
Conclusion: "Therefore . . . § 3501, enacted . . . pursuant to
Congress' unquestioned power to establish the rules of
procedure and evidence.., is constitutional... [and]
the admissibility of confessions in federal court is
governed by § 3501, rather than... Miranda.
14' Dickerson II, 166 F.3d at 672 (citations omitted).
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The problem with this proof is the articulation of the minor premise, the
ambiguity of "rule." The "rule" of Miranda can mean either the larger
"ruling" or the specific "rules." The Supreme Court laid out ruling and rules
there as follows.
[Tihe prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege
against self-incrimination.. ..As for the procedural safeguards to be employed,
unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their
right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the
following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be
warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may
be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an
attorney, either retained, or appointed. 42
The distinction is critical; the general rule requiring "fully effective"
procedural safeguards is grounded in the Fifth Amendment, but the specific
rules, the Miranda warnings themselves, are not. The Fourth Circuit
demonstrates no more than that the traditional Miranda warnings are just one
example of "fully" effective safeguards.
In rhetorical terms, the court has built its argument around a half-truth. It
is true that the warnings in themselves are not "rights," but it is equally true
that the Constitution, as interpreted by the interpreter of last resort in
Miranda, requires some "fully effective" means of informing suspects of their
rights. 43  Arguments that use half-truths as premises are particularly
dangerous, because they appear so plausible: premises and logic seem sound,
but the conclusion may as easily be wrong as right. Such arguments have a
sinister totalitarian pedigree.
In Gricean terms, arguments from half-truths are false implicatures under
the maxim of quantity. Readers assume that sufficient information is being
provided by the writer, neither too much or too little. This credulousness is
exploited where, as here, information is selectively and incompletely
provided.
142 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
1 The Supreme Court points out the Fourth Circuit's mistake, but it does so in a mild and
civil fashion that contrasts with the lower court's bombast.
The Court of Appeals relied in part on our statement that the Miranda decision in no way
"creates a 'constitutional straightjacket."' See [Dickerson II,]166 F.3d at 672 (quoting
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467,86 S. Ct. 1602). However, a review of our opinion in Miranda
clarifies that this disclaimer was intended to indicate that the Constitution does not require
police to administer the particular Miranda warnings, not that the Constitution does not
require a procedure that is effective in securing Fifth Amendment rights.
Dickerson 11I, 120 S. Ct. at 2334 n.6 (internal citations).
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In ethical terms, the court violates Audi's evidential and proportional
principles when it supports its decision with the non-constitutionality of the
Miranda warnings themselves. Improperly weighting a weak reason, the court
fails to provide a "good" reason.
In its zeal to buttress its weak argument with a string of quotes from the
Supreme Court, however, the Fourth Circuit sets a bomb ticking in its
argument. Having cited the Supreme Court's invitation to Congress and the
states "to develop their own safeguards for [protecting] the privilege" (line 10-
11), the Fourth Circuit is led to characterize § 3501 as "enacted at the
invitation of the Supreme Court" (line 14). Yet, in the very first sentence of
its opinion, the circuit court had already, and accurately, characterized § 3501
as an attempt by Congress to overrule Miranda and "restor[e]" the former
"voluntariness" enquiry.'" Indeed, in Section III B, the court will spend three
pages establishing that, in enacting § 3501, Congress intended to "reverse"
Miranda and return to a "case-by-case determination of whether a confession
was voluntary."' 45 The Supreme Court is surely not in the habit of "inviting"
Congress to "reverse" the Court by reestablishing precisely the ruling that the
Court itself has struck down. The contradiction causes the Miranda I § 3501
argument to self-destruct.
c. Section III B
The rhetorical excesses of the opening paragraph and Section I recur in
Section 111 B - where the Fourth Circuit elaborates on its Miranda / § 3501
analysis - and three more are added: misuse of precedent, the willful
distortion of dissenting views, and the refusal to entertain questions.
Before beginning its analysis, the court leads the reader on a digression into
Miranda scholarship that perhaps tells the reader more than the court intends.
"Interestingly," the court begins, "much of the scholarly literature on Miranda
deals not with whether Congress has the legislative authority to overrule the
presumption created in Miranda, but whether it should."'" The court then
cites articles on both sides of the debate over Miranda's effect on conviction
rates, including three articles by Paul G. Cassell, attorney for amici curiae in
Dickerson. The court then pronounces: "This debate, however, is one we need
not enter. Whether Congress should overrule Miranda tells us nothing about
whether it could. More importantly, it is not our role to answer that question.
'44 Dickerson 11, 166 F.3d at 671.
'41 Id. at 684-87.
'" Id. at 687. A careful reader's rule of thumb holds that when a judge precedes a
proposition with "interestingly," the judge's reason for stating the proposition is often far more
interesting than the proposition itself.
University of Hawai'i Law Review / Vol. 23:1
It is the province of the judiciary to determine what the law is, not what it
should be.'
147
Despite this boiler-plate disclaimer, the court appears to believe that
Miranda allows felons to escape conviction and that it should be overruled.
At the conclusion of its analysis, the court seems to breathe a sigh of relief:
"No longer will criminals who have voluntarily confessed their crimes be
released on mere technicalities."'' 8 Here, as in its earlier charge that the
government was "taking the Fifth," the court reveals that separation of powers
is not the motivating reason behind its decision; the characterization of those
rules of law with which the court does not agree as "mere technicalities,"' 49
like the expression "taking the fifth," is part of the law and order rhetoric that
accompanies a conservative political agenda.
There are substantial costs associated with both the-pretense of impartiality
and the concealment of a court's real reasons. First, as Audi points out, an
advocate who gives a non-motivating reason asks the audience to "stand on
ground [the advocate does] not share.""' ° The lack of respect inherent in such
expectation is magnified when the advocate is a judge and the audience is
bound by conclusions supported with non-motivating reasons. Second, it is
difficult to predict the future behavior of advocates who do not provide their
real reasons - a substantial consideration when judicial opinions are
concerned.' Finally, simple respect for truth would appear to require that
judges prefer motivating to non-motivating reasons."
Even if the court does consider the overruling of Miranda to be a good
thing, it may be objected here that it is illogical and unfair to tax it with
insincerity and consequently with violating Audi's motivational principle -
the court's ostensible reason, Congress' power to overrule Miranda, is also its
real reason. Even if it is a reason, however, the contrived and over-simplified
nature of the legal argument, and its mockery of the fifth amendment, suggests
that the court is making an argument that does not entirely motivate its own
belief that § 3501 is good law. Although the court elaborates in section In B
on its argument that the "rule" of Miranda is not grounded in the Constitution,
it still proves no more than that the specific procedures set out in Miranda are
147 id.
'8 Id. at 692.
149 See, e.g., id. The phrase "technical violation of Miranda" is always used in Dickerson to
describe the failure to provide Miranda warnings. The phrase is repeated so often that it
becomes a kind of mantra. Yet viewed with less partiality, apparent "technicalities" reveal
themselves to be, like the Miranda warnings, complicated answers to complicated problems.
150 Audi, supra note 32, at 261.
"' See id at 262.
152 See id.
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not required by the Constitution. It is difficult to believe that such a weak
reason can be a motivating reason.
In an attempt to persuade the reader that it is a good reason, the court uses
Supreme Court precedent lavishly, but disingenuously, hiding the forest in the
trees. The quotations are all accurate, but one fact is left unnoted. All but one
of the cases cited to demonstrate the a-constitutionality of Miranda are cases
in which the Supreme Court applied Miranda to either a State criminal court
proceeding or a federal habeas corpus petition,' where the Supreme Court
may only decide issues arising out of the Constitution. " The court never
addresses this issue.
In Section I B, the court employs two final rhetorical abuses: the distortion
beyond recognition of dissenting views and the refusal to entertain questions.
The dissenter's § 3501 / Miranda contention is brief and simple. He argues,
first, that it is inappropriate to decide an issue of such significance sua
sponte, on the sole basis of "about two pages from amici that the majority
agrees with."' 5 The dissenter then continues:
The majority holds that § 3501 governs the admissibility of confessions in
federal court because Miranda is not a constitutional rule. I don't know whether
it is or not, but before I had to decide, I would want thoughtful lawyers on both
sides to answer one question for me. If Miranda is not a constitutional rule, why
does the Supreme Court continue to apply it in prosecutions arising in state
courts? See[,] e.g., Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 114 S.Ct. [1899],
[114] L.E.2d 293 (1994) (per curium); see also, Mu Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S.
415, 422, 111 S.Ct. 1899, 114 L.E.2d 493 (1991) (noting that with respect to
cases tried in state court, the Supreme Court's "authority is limited to enforcing
the commands of the United States Constitution"). This question illustrates that
' The only exception is Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994), which concerned a
court martial.
" See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560,569-70 (1981) (state cases); 18 U.S.C. § 2254(a)
(2000) (habeas corpus only for claims that person is in custody "in violation of the Constitution
or laws" of the United States).
The court also uses precedent in less than candid fashion to support its assertion that the
Supreme Court disapproves of irrebuttable presumptions in criminal cases and thus of
Miranda's presumption of involuntariness. The court cites to Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S.
510 (1979), with a "cf." signal and the parenthetical "recognizing the harmful effects created
by the use of mandatory conclusive presumptions in criminal cases." Although "cf."
conventionally signals an analogy to the stated preposition, there is no principled analogy to
Sandstrom. In Sandstrom the court determined that the common jury instruction that "we are
presumed to intend the ordinary consequences of our actions" created a conclusive presumption
that conflicts with the presumption of innocence and therefore violates a defendant's right to
Due Process. To cite Sandstrom to support the overruling of Miranda's presumption that
unwarned confessions are coerced, as the Fourth Circuit does, is to create a false implicature,
exploiting the ieader's expectation that cited authority will be relevant.
ISS Dickerson 1I, 166 F.3d at 697 (Michael. J., dissenting in part).
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the § 3501 issue is so sweeping that we should not be delving into it on our own.
In this case, we should follow our usual practice of deciding only the issues
raised by parties."5 6
The rhetorical candor here is remarkable even for a dissenter. While, as in
Dickerson, the authors of majority opinions seek to foreclose doubt, dissenters
traditionally seek to foster it. But it is rare for a judge to so openly entertain
doubt, saying "I don't know," even in dissent, and to ask a question without
answering it.
The majority's response to the dissent displays judicial rhetoric at its worst,
mischaracterizing opposing views and refusing to allow any challenge to its
own reasoning.' At the end of Section lII, B, the majority writes:
We are reassured in our conclusion by the fact that our dissenting colleague,
after examining all of the relevant authority at his disposal, has been unable to
conclude differently. At best, the dissent can but pose a rhetorical question
concerning the constitutionality of § 3501. Apparently, all of the relevant
authority of which the dissent is aware supports the conclusion we reach today.
As a consequence, we have no difficulty holding that the admissibility of
confessions in federal court is governed by § 3501, rather than the judicially
created rule of Miranda.'"8
This is a material distortion of the dissenter's view, as the dissenter himself
points out in a footnote.
The majority misses my point when it erroneously suggests that I have
examined all of the relevant authority and cannot conclude that Miranda renders
§ 3501 unconstitutional. My point is that we should not be examining the
question at all, much less deciding it. For the record, however, not everyone
156 id.
... Justice Scalia similarly mischaracterizes the views of his colleagues in the majority. The
Court would not agree with Scalia's statement that it disregarded "[C]ongressional action that
concededly does not violate the Constitution .... " Dickerson III, 120 S. Ct. at 2342. The
construction of the latter sentence (deliberately?) conceals the identity of the conceding party,
but the most likely party, the majority, would surely not concede that § 3501 was a legitimate
exercise of power since the statute contradicted the Court's interpretation of the Fifth
Amendment. Ironically, Justice Rehnquist has been taken to task for using "[c]oncededly"
where no concession has been made. See Richard Weisberg, How Judges Speak: Some Lessons
on Adjudication in Billy Budd, Sailor, with an Application to Justice Rehnquist, 57 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1, 47 (1982).
Scalia also engages in willful misreading of Miranda. He writes, for example, "What is
most remarkable about Miranda ... is its palpable hostility toward the act of confession,"
Dickerson II!, 120 S. Ct. at 2339 (Scalia, J., dissenting), and "[p]reventing foolish (rather than
compelled) confessions is... the only conceivable basis" for the rules suggested in Miranda.
lI Such gross misreading approaches ad hominem argument, seeming to impugn the motives
of the Warren Court.
158 Dickerson I1, 166 F.3d at 692.
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agrees with the majority. See I Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 76 (2d. ed.) ("Unless the [Supreme] Court overrules Miranda, or
holds that the 1968 statute [§ 3501] has successfully accomplished this, lower
courts must follow the decision rather than the statute."); I. Wayne R. LaFave
& Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 6.5(e) (1984) (§ 3501 "is
unconstitutional to the extent that it purports to repeal Miranda.")59
But worse than the majority's characterization of the dissenter's doubt as
assent is its refusal to respond to the question he raises. This refusal is
disrespectfully dismissive in its manner of refusing - by deeming the question
irrelevant, unworthy of an answer.
In the end, the dissent poses only the following rhetorical question: "If
Miranda is not a constitutional rule, why does the Supreme Court continue to
apply it in prosecutions arising in state courts." Post at 697. As noted above, the
Supreme Court has stated in unmistakable terms that the rule set forth in
Miranda is not required by the Constitution. See ante at 688-90. In fact, in one
of the Supreme Court's most recent applications of Miranda to a state court
prosecution the Supreme Court specifically stated that "Miranda's safeguards
are not constitutional in character." Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680,690-91,
113 S.Ct. 1745, 123 L.E.2d 407 (1993). Thus, although the dissent raises an
interesting academic question, the answer to why the Supreme Court applies
Miranda in prosecutions arising in state courts has no bearing on our conclusion
that Miranda's conclusive presumption is not required by the Constitution."
The refusal to entertain questions is disrespectful, but to deny the relevance
of the question itself is a still more disrespectful strategy. Moreover, it is
ironic that the majority chooses to dismiss the question here by calling it
"rhetorical." Although it is not unusual for courts to deny their own
rhetoricity,16' it is incongruous for a court that itself uses manipulative
language practices to employ "rhetorical" as a derogatory term. Moreover, the
court's evasion of the question here is disrespectful in its lack of candor. The
court's refusal to answer cannot be motivated by a belief that the dissent's
question concerning the application of Miranda to the states is irrelevant. On
the contrary, the real reason why the court cannot entertain the question is that
the only possible answers are unacceptable. There are only two possible
explanations for the Court's continued application of Miranda in state cases:
1) the Miranda rule is required by the Constitution, or 2) for 35 years, the
1S9 Id. at 697, n.* (Michael, J., dissenting).
'60 Id. at 691, n.21.
161 See Wetlaufer, supra note 4, at 1555, 1590. It also appears from the context that the
Dickerson 11 court is using "rhetorical question" to mean a question that deserves no answer.
See Dickerson 11, 166 F.3d at 691 n.21. In fact, a "rhetorical question" is a question that needs
no answer, "something phrased as a question only for dramatic effect and not to seek an answer,
such as who cares? (= nobody cares)." OxFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 581 (1980).
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Supreme Court has been doing something it has no power to do: imposing
non-constitutional rules of evidence and procedure on the state courts. 62
The second answer is the only one consonant with the constitutionality of
§ 3501, but to utter it would be lase majesty. No matter how disrespectful the
court permits itself to be toward counsel and dissent, it must present at least
the appearance of respect for its hierarchical superior, the Supreme Court.
Ironically, this respect deprives the Dickerson court of the only principled
argument for the constitutionality of § 3501, and the very conclusion Justice
Scalia would reach:' 63 Miranda was a mistake.'6
In sum, the rhetoric of the majority opinion in United States v. Dickerson
combines an intermittently exaggerated respect for the Supreme Court with
disrespect for the rest of its audience - parties, counsel, dissenter, the general
reader. As we have seen, this disrespect takes many forms. And although
Dickerson is undoubtedly an extreme example of judicial rhetoric, it is far
from an anomaly." It is the rare judicial opinion that does not overstate the
strength of its own reasoning, misstate opposing views, and provide reasons
that do not motivate the court's own belief. Many engage as well in the even
more disrespectful practices noted here - false implicature, misuse of
precedent, evasion of hard questions, and vilifying those who hold opposing
views.
This is the reality of much judicial prose: a rhetoric that too often seeks to
subdue rather than to educate. And our courts are highly unlikely to adopt a
more ethical, more cooperative rhetoric anytime soon. Nonetheless, it is
troubling to contemplate the possible effects of disrespectful judicial rhetoric
- compliance without respect, oversimplification, institutionalized deception.
One can be forgiven for wondering whether, in the end, a legal education and
'Q See Yale Kamisar, Confessions, Search and Seizure and the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA
L.J. 465, 498 (1999).
,63 Dickerson Ill, 120 S. Ct. at 2337 (Scalia. J., dissenting).
'" Our colleague, Susan Herman, suggested that this institutional constraint might override
motivational, evidential, and proportionality principles - that is, it might be ethical to give weak
and non-motivating reasons when advancing one's real reasons would violate hierarchical
norms.
16 See, e.g., Minersville School District v. Gobitus, 310 U.S. 586 (1940); Parker v. Levy,
417 U.S. 733 (1973); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989); Division of
Employment v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). These opinions all reflect a conservative cast of
mind, and we are mindful of J.B. White's question whether defenders of individual rights
sometimes sink to the rhetorical lows that bedevil the cases cited above. White points to sone
of the excesses of Justice Douglas, singling out Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
and Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959). And we have noticed that even those courts that
generally use rhetoric ethically occasionally engage in disingenuous practices. See, e.g., Kelly
v. Gwinnell, 476 A.3d 1219 (N.J. 1984).
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the rhetorical excesses it can foster are not the worst preparation for ajudicial
career.
B. The Rhetoric of Appellate Advocacy: Briefs in Support of and in
Opposition to Petition for Rehearing En Banc in United States v. Dickerson
Because in United States v. Dickerson a panel of the Fourth Circuit decided
an issue raised only by amici, an examination of the rhetoric of appellate
advocacy in the context of the Miranda I§ 3501 debate requires that we look
primarily at the briefs of counsel and amici in support of and in opposition to
rehearing en banc rather than at the briefs on appeal. ' When we look at the
briefs in support of and in opposition to rehearing, we find that the unusual
situation in Dickerson makes for some illuminating rhetorical practices and
singular role behavior.
The role of appellate counsel logically entails a rhetoric of representative
advocacy, while a rhetoric of subscriptive advocacy would seem more
appropriate for amici curiae, since in principle these "friends" of court
disinterestedly advocate the public good."7 In the Dickerson briefs, roles and
rhetoric can be observed both in conflict and in concert.
First, we have amicus curiae, the Washington Legal Foundation (WLF),
nominally a subscriptive advocate, who assumes the representative role of
prosecution. Its credibility and ethicity are ultimately diminished by its
disrespectful, take-no-prisoners rhetoric.
Next, we have the United States Attorney and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), whose role calls for representative advocacy, but whose expressed
belief in the constitutional status of Miranda makes them subscriptive
advocates cautiously arguing the same proposition as counsel for Dickerson.
This role confusion seems at first glance to weaken the persuasiveness of the
government's arguments. Further reflection suggests, however, that its
thoughtful and measured argument enhances both persuasiveness and ethical
credibility.
Finally, on Dickerson's side, we have his counsel's brief and those of two
amici, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL). Counsel for Dickerson
weds his role as defense attorney with uncompromising representative rhetoric
that avoids disrespectful excesses. The rhetoric of amici ACLU and NACDL
is more representative than subscriptive, largely indistinguishable from that
6 The amicus briefs of the Washington Legal Foundation and the Safe Streets Coalition
(WLF/SSC) on appeal and in United States v. Leong, 116 F.3d 1474 (4th Cir. 1997), will also
be briefly examined since they prompted the Fourth Circuit's decision in Dickerson.
67 In practice, however, the rhetoric of amicus briefs tends toward the representative, and
is largely indistinguishable from that of counsel for the parties.
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of counsel for defendant-appellant Dickerson, but in traditional terms these are
model briefs - crisp, yet dignified, with none of the mud-slinging and rabble-
rousing that mar the opposition brief of amicus WLF. Nonetheless, we came
away from a study of all five briefs with a subversive sense that the most
persuasive is the most subscriptive and least adversarial - that of the
prosecution compelled by circumstance to argue out-of-role.
1. Amicus brief of the WLF in opposition to rehearing
The brief of the WLF, like the majority decision in Dickerson, is tainted by
rhetorical excesses that violate Audi's threshold and desirability principles.
First, there is an outright untruth stemming from a violation of the maxim of
quality (the statement will be truthful and based on sufficient evidence). On
the question of whether the continued application of Miranda to the states is
an indication it is a constitutional rule, the WLF says it "may represent no
more than the application of the Court's judicially-created, but not
constitutionally mandated, remedial scheme in the absence of legislatively
devised alternatives."' Because the Supreme Court has no power to impose
any "remedial scheme" on state courts in the absence of a constitutional
mandate, this is not a viable argument."
Then there are ipse dixit arguments. The WLF commends the Fourth
Circuit for holding that the requirement that a court "consider several Miranda
factors, as well as some additional ones" means § 3501 goes beyond merely
restoring the pre-Miranda voluntariness standard. 7' Yet requiring courts to
consider giving Miranda warnings or creating factors for after-the-fact
assessment of voluntariness does not on its face establish procedures as "fully
as effective as... [Miranda warnings] in informing accused persons of their
right of silence and in affording a continuous opportunity to exercise it,"' 7 ' a
caveat to permissible alternatives that the Warren Court adds and that the
'" Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation in Opposition to Petition for Rehearing at 10-
11, Dickerson If, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999) (No. 97-4750), rev'd, Dickerson II, 120 S. Ct.
2326 (2000) [hereinafter Brief of the WLF in Opposition to Rehearing]. Why the Court has
applied Miranda in state cases and federal habeas cases for 35 years if it is not constitutionally
mandated is the question at the heart of the Miranda I §3501 debate. It has, as noted in Part IIA,
only two possible answers: 1) Miranda is indeed constitutionally mandated or 2) the Court has
been mistakenly doing something it has no power to do. See supra note 162 and accompanying
text. Because the WLF cannot accuse the Court of blundering, amicus equivocates. Faced with
the same dilemma, the Fourth Circuit called the question "rhetorical." Dickerson 11, 166 F.3d
at 691 n.21; see also supra note 161.
"6 See e.g., Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318 (1994).
170 Brief of the WLF in Opposition to Rehearing at 11 n.6, Dickerson I1, (No. 97-4750).
171 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 490.
2000 / SHOOTING FROM THE LIP
Fourth Circuit and the WLF ignore.'72 Despite amici's ipse dixit contention
that Section 3501 does more than restore the pre-Miranda voluntariness test,
there is no evidence that it does so.'73
There are strawman arguments based on a misstatement of opposing views.
The WLF condemns the DOJ for asking the court to rehear a case in order to
apply different law than the panel did when the Department knows that the
law it wants the court to apply is "incorrect.' ' 74 The Department would not
concede this, however. Rather it thinks that there is another "equally well-
established" line of cases that might govern the problem.'
In addition, there are a host of disrespectful language practices that breach
an ethic of ethos and pathos. There are peevish, incredulous ad hominem
attacks on the Department of Justice similar to those made in the Fourth
Circuit's opinion. On the Department's refusal to pursue the Section 3501
issue, amici say, "this unique and unwarranted posture of the Department of
Justice is itself reason enough for the Court to exercise its discretion to deny
172 Like the blurb in an advertisement for a film, the Fourth Circuit and the WLF quote
selectively and out-of-context.
113 In fact, the WLFISSC seem aware of this in their earlier brief in Leong. There they
concede "Section 3501 cannot be read in splendid isolation .... [I]t must be examined against
the backdrop of all federal law that bears on the subject .... Taken together, these remedies
along with section 3501 form a constitutional alternative to the Miranda exclusionary rule."
Brief of Amici Curiae Washington Legal Foundation and Safe Streets Coalition in Response to
Supplemental Briefs of the Parties and Amicus National Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers at
21-22, United States v. Leong, 116 F.3d 1474 (4th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision)
[hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae WLF/SSC].
'14 Brief of the WLF in Opposition to Rehearing at 16, Dickerson I (No. 97-4750).
"' There are also strawman arguments in an earlier brief of the WLF/SSC in Leong. There,
the WLF/SSC assert that "[i]n order to warrant disregarding Section 3501 in this case, the
argument the Department of Justice would have to make is that the lower courts have a duty to
follow a non-constitutional Supreme Court holding instead of an Act of Congress superseding
that holding." Brief of Amici Curiae WLF/SSC at 3, Leong (No. 96-4876). But that is not the
argument the Department of Justice would make. It would and did instead argue that it had a
duty to follow a Supreme Court holding on a constitutional requirement.
Other strawman arguments in Leong are coupled with overstatement and condescension.
"The centerpiece of the Department's brief is the claim that the Supreme Court has already
decided the constitutionality of § 3501, and the brief diligently marshals every bit of supporting
court dicta." Id. at 7-8. But the Department of Justice does not claim the Supreme Court has
decided the issue. In fact, in Dickerson, it says instead that lower courts should not apply §
3501 to admit confessions that Miranda would exclude because the Supreme Court has said
"[w]e reaffirm that if a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to
rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the
case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own
decisions." Brief for the United States in Support of Partial Hearing En Banc at 12, Dickerson
II, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999) (No. 97-4750), rev'd, Dickerson III, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000)
[hereinafter Brief for the United States in Support of Partial Hearing].
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en banc rehearing. "176 Unique? Seven administrations have adopted this
position. "Reason enough to deny en banc rehearing"? This assumes it is
more important to punish the Department for its "defiance" than to give
plenary consideration to a novel issue of surpassing importance to an
individual and to the community. The WLF's vengefulness breaches its
ethical persona.
Indeed, the WLF' s advocacy consistently violates Wasserstrom' s notion of
"the respect due all persons. . ., and the resulting wrongness in viewing or
using members of the moral community solely as means to some further end,
as things to be used as one might utilize artifacts or other objects."1 7 For the
WLF, Dickerson is only a means to an end, which is to bring the § 3501 issue
first before the Fourth Circuit and then before the Supreme Court. This is, to
some degree, an ethical failing shared by all anicus briefs - the friends of the
court often have little interest in the fate of the individual parties. But the
WLF takes this a step further, advocating a decontextualized form of appellate
review based entirely on argument by amici. Its discussion of the equity of
deciding an issue raised only by anicus curiae does not enhance its image,
however.'
[T]he Dickerson Court was expressly made aware of, and had available to it, the
Foundation's voluminous briefs on Section 3501 filed in both Leong and United
States v. Sullivan, the predecessor cases to Dickerson. While Dickerson did not
brief Section 3501 in this Court, he had ample opportunity to address it in his
brief as appellee, and/or in oral argument, and he could have sought permission
to file a supplemental, post-argument brief once he saw the extent of the panel's
interest in the issue. 179
Although defense counsel might with hindsight be faulted for failing to
brief a potentially harmful issue, even though it was not put into contention
by the government, the WLF's statement makes us equally aware of the
legitimacy of the defendant's concern that the court proceeded with only one-
sided briefing from amici for the United States in other cases and this one.
176 Brief of WLF in Opposition to Petition for Rehearing at 3, Dickerson I (No. 97-4750).
177 Wasserstrom, supra note 1, at 28.
178 Counsel for Dickerson argued,
[t]his case has raised an issue of tremendous import, yet Mr. Dickerson was given little,
if any, real chance to weigh in on the matter. Regardless of the holding in this case,
notions of fundamental fairness and due process dictate that the party whose interests are
most adversely affected by the Court's actions should be given the full opportunity to
brief and argue the issue.
Appellee's Petition for Rehearing at 10 n.9, Dickerson 11, (No. 97-4750).
179 Brief of WLF in Opposition to Petition for Rehearing at 16 n.9, Dickerson I, (No. 97-
4750) (citations omitted).
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The WLF can also be downright insulting, calling the Department's
petition for a rehearing "coy,""ms though it is unclear what conceivable
justification it has for describing the government's position - even if it has
vacillated - as "coquettish." As if this were not enough, the WLF/SSC also
have a history of hyperbole and disdain. In Leong, they argue the DOJ is
"unable to answer" arguments that Miranda's exclusionary rule is not
constitutional and instead enlists "a red herring: the lower court's duty to
follow the Supreme Court's constitutional holdings.''. This argument is not
just inapposite, the WLF/SSC says, it is "wholly inapposite."'8 2 The DOJ's
failure to discuss United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, a case not involving a
custodial confession, is criticized not just for being absent from the
defendant's brief, but for being "notably absent."' 3 In an argument ad
hominem, the DOJ, in refusing to argue for § 3501,
seems not to have the kind of legal judgment that is properly the province of the
Executive Branch, but rather a political judgment that (for some inscrutable and
unarticulated reason) § 3501 should not have been passed by Congress .... The
Court should not sanction the Department's maneuvers to avoid its duty to
faithfully execute the law.'8
Yet, the WLF/SSC has its own political agenda that leaks out in their
amicus brief in support of the United States in Dickerson. They admit the
"explosion of violent crime" compels measures that will "diminish the misuse
of our justice system by criminal defendants" and that will prevent "the
release of dangerous criminals" because of "technical Miranda claims." '' 8
Moreover, the WLF/SSC argue "Dickerson would in no way have been
unfairly prejudiced by the district court's consideration of § 3501," especially
because "[p]rejudice concerns are, in any event, simply inapplicable because
Dickerson (and the United States) both had affirmative duties to direct the
district court's attention to the statute .. 8..6
There is room in advocacy for indignation over perceived miscarriages of
justice. But obfuscation, mockery, incredulity, and condescension aimed at
professionals with sincere differences of opinion are bad taste, bad rhetoric,
and bad ethics. Moreover, even if such practices can be condoned as
ISo ld. at 17. "Coy" has nasty and sexist connotations.
Brief of Amici Curiae WLFISSC at 3, Leong (No. 96-4876).
182 id.
83 id. at 8.
'8 Id. at 30.
"' Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation and the Safe Streets Coalition as Amici Curiae
in Support of the Appellant United States at 2, Dickerson 11, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999)
(No.97-4750), rev'd, Dickerson 111, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000) [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae
WLF/SSCJ.
186 Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
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expressions of zealous advocacy likely to be neutralized by equally zealous
opposing rhetoric, one serious consequence remains. The rhetoric of the
winning side is all too often perpetuated in the court's opinion.'87
In Dickerson, the Fourth Circuit incorporates into its opinion some of the
dubious rhetorical practices of the WLF/SSC in their brief on appeal from the
district court. Indeed some of the logical fallacies the Court committed in its
decision were first made by the WLF/SSC in their brief. The amici were the
first to admit that § 3501 was enacted specifically to overrule the rules
promulgated in Miranda and to restore the voluntariness standard,' admitting
§ 3501 "establishes a 'lenient' standard of admissibility."'89 Then, perhaps
fearing that rules as effective as Miranda warnings are indeed constitutionally
required, they equivocate - making the ipse dixit argument that § 3501 is as
effective. This equivocation causes their argument on procedural safeguards
to self-destruct, as the court's arguments on this issue did."g° The circuit court
also echoed in Dickerson many of the disrespectful language practices of the
WLF, mocking all parties on the Miranda side of the Mirandal § 3501 debate
but singling out the DOJ. However distasteful this is in an advocate, the
consequential nature of judicial rhetoric and public perception of judicial
integrity suggest the rightness of a higher standard of decorum.
2. Prosecution's brief in partial support of rehearing
The prosecution in Dickerson manifests a very different view than the WLF
of the moral and professional responsibilities of an appellate advocate. The
WLF finds it extraordinary that the Department disregards its traditional duty
to defend an Act of Congress against a constitutional challenge whenever a
"reasonable argument can be made in its defense."'' The Department of
Justice, however, has a view akin to that advanced by Audi, who argues
'a7 Indeed, Justice Scalia's sneering litany of the majority's "word games" (in trying to
equate "constitutional underpinning" "constitutional origin" and "constitutionally based" with
"constitutional"), Dickerson lll, 120 S.Ct. at 2348 (Scalia, J., dissenting), is modeled on his
former clerk's amici brief which offers a similar sarcastic litany: "The Department maintains that
... Miranda rules are based on 'constitutional premises'; 'rests on a constitutional foundation';
or has 'constitutional footings' or 'moorings.' These phrases have no fixed meaning and of little
assistance in answering... whether Miranda's exclusionary rule can be modified by Congress."
Brief of WLF in Opposition to Rehearing at 7, n.3, Dickerson H (No. 97-4158) (citations
omitted).
"I Brief of the WLF/Safe Streets, Dickerson at 5.
89 Id. at 6.
190 See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
"' Brief of WLF in Opposition to Rehearing at 19, Dickerson ! (No. 97-4750); see also id.
at 20.
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it is essential we not take our moral obligations to extend only to acting within
our rights or to be defined wholly by our social roles. Morality is more
demanding than that. It gives primacy to our character as agents; it provides
ideals as well as restrictions, and it prevents us from submerging our moral
autonomy in our professional roles. 9"
The Department takes the moral high road in refusing to pursue an argument
that is consistent with its traditional role, because that argument seems to be
contrary to its understanding of the Constitution. Interestingly, the Depart-
ment of Justice does not defend its position using the unbridled rhetoric of
representative advocacy. Instead it is openly subscriptive, prefacing its
arguments with "we believe," where traditional appellate advocacy would
simply assert. Moreover, it is remarkably candid about the ambiguity of
authority.'93
For example, although arguing "[tihe Miranda decision was itself clearly
based on the Constitution, for it held that '[u]nless adequate protective devices
are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no
statement.., can be truly the product of... free choice,""" the DOJ also
admits the Supreme Court has "retreated from that aspect of its reasoning."
19
The DOJ concedes that "[rlead in isolation, there is language in Tucker and
its progeny that might be read to support [a] conclusion" that "Miranda is a
'judicially created rule' that could be supplanted by legislation." 96 Yet, it
suggests that the Court review the whole "body of Supreme Court
jurisprudence on this issue"'97 because "an equally well-established line of
Supreme Court cases. . . directly requires the conclusion that Miranda has a
constitutional basis."'19 The Department of Justice points to Miranda's
consistent application to the states and on federal habeas review to put Tucker
et al in perspective.
This candor is atypical of advocacy rhetoric. For example, although the
DOJ concedes that Tucker establishes Miranda's rules as not per se
constitutional, amici for the ACLU, more typically and more traditionally, find
ways of discussing Tucker and its progeny in much more affirmative terms,
as follows.
192 Audi, supra note 32, at 281.
193 Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the majority in Dickerson adopts this candor when it
admits "there is language in some of our opinions that supports the view taken by [the Fourth
Circuit]. Dickerson IIl, 120 S. Ct. at 2333.
'94 Brief for the United States in Support of Partial Rehearing at 8, Dickerson (No. 97-4750).
195 Id.
196 Id. at 9.
'97 Id. at 6.
198 Id.
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To be sure, the Supreme Court held in Tucker and Elstad that failure to give
warnings will not support exclusion of "fruits" derived from a confession. But
both Elstad and Tucker recognized.. . that failure to give warning requires
exclusion of even voluntary statements .... The tainted fruit holding of Elstad
and Tucker therefore cannot support the panel's sweeping conclusion that
Miranda's warning requirement ... was nevertheless without constitutional
foundation.' 99
We can only speculate as to why the prosecution uses the traditional
rhetoric of advocacy only intermittently. It is possible that the U.S. Attorney
is not in agreement with the Department of Justice's Miranda policy, and its
compelled obedience is reflected in argument lacking the traditional indicia
of zealous appellate advocacy. The prosecution's rhetoric of advocacy may
have suffered when it crossed boundary lines and assumed an unfamiliar role
that required it to temper statements to accord with past postures or related
department policies.2°" As Audi remarked, "[i]t is both prudentially unwise
and morally undesirable to be valuationally fragmented."' It is equally
possible, however, that the seriousness of the issue influenced the DOJ's
decision to use language more respectfully. Perhaps a measured response is
the government's proper response. Given its responsibility to effective law
enforcement and a general respect for individual rights, in the long run, the
Department of Justice's departure from traditional advocacy may be both
ethical and persuasive.
3. Defense and amici briefs in support of rehearing
Because counsel for Dickerson and the defense amici, ACLU and NACDL,
are primarily concerned with preventing unwarranted restriction of liberty,
some rhetorical flourish in their briefs is justified.' They, thus, all open with
a focus on the big picture. For example, the defense opens with a direct
reference to Congress's attempt to overrule Miranda, an attempt it
characterizes as an abuse of power. It quotes extensively language in Miranda
indicating that the Court was applying the Fifth Amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination in the context of custodial interrogation and was
engaged, therefore, in constitutional decisionmaking when it constructed a
1" Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae in Support of Rehearing
at 8-9, Dickerson II, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999) (No. 97-4750), rev'd, Dickerson III, 120 S.
Ct. 2326 (2000) [hereinafter Brief of Amicus Curiae ACLU].
' The WLF refers to some departmental inconsistency in its amicus brief in opposition to
rehearing. Brief of the WLF in Opposition to Rehearing at 20 n. 13, Dickerson ll(No. 97-4750).
201 Audi, supra note 32, at 270.
It can, of course, be objected that they are also advocating the suppression of evidence,
arguably a morally criticizable undertaking in that it can hardly be said to serve truth.
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rule protecting it." 3 Similarly, the ACLU opens by characterizing the
Miranda warnings as essential if the Fifth Amendment's protection against
compelled self-incrimination is to be meaningful, describing that Fifth
Amendment right as "essential to the preservation of our accusatorial system
of criminal justice."' It closes by reminding the court that a 1988 American
Bar Association study concluded that the warning requirement "does not have
a significant impact on law enforcement's ability to solve crime or to
prosecute criminals successfully." 5 The ACLU adds that Miranda has been
"remarkably successful in the 30 years since it was announced .... [It] has
created guidance for the police while at the same time ensuring that suspects
are informed of their constitutional rights prior to questioning."'  This
emphasis on the importance of Miranda and its careful balancing of the
interests reminds the readers what is at stake. As the NACDL says: "The
panel's decision deprives citizens of this Circuit of the constitutional
safeguards afforded all other citizens of this country." 7  Although this
conclusion is ad populem, it is not unethical rhetoric because it does not
appeal to feelings one would be ashamed of acting upon.
The WLF also ends with an ad populem argument, arguing that § 3501
protects the public from the "windfall" Miranda gives to dangerous felons.
But Audi and Wasserstrom would distinguish between these two adpopulem
arguments. There is a difference between adpopulem arguments mustered to
protect civil rights when the government bears down on an individual and ad
populum arguments that exploit fear and self interest to minimize those rights.
Unlike the WLF, which uses the defendant as a means to an end,' 8 the
defense tries to remind the court that justice to Dickerson is an end in itself.
Dickerson's counsel reminds the court that fundamental fairness requires
giving defendant a "full opportunity to brief and argue the issue."'
... Appellee's Petition for Rehearing at 4, Dickerson H (No. 97-4750).
204 Brief of Amicus Curiae ACLU at 1, Dickerson 1I(No. 97-4750); see also Brief of Amicus
Curiae of the National Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers in Support of Defendant-Appellee's
Petition for Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc at 3, Dickerson II, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999)
(No.97-4750), rev'd, Dickerson 111, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000) [hereinafter Brief of Amicus Curiae
NACDL] (stating that "the Fifth Amendment preserves... principles of humanity[,J civil
liberty" and privilege fulfilled only when the accused is fully apprised of his rights); Appellee
Petition for Rehearing at 5, Dickerson II(No.97-4750) (stating that Miranda "go[es] to the roots
of our concepts of American criminal jurisprudence [and] the restraints society must observe
consistent with the Federal Constitution in prosecuting individuals for crime").
m Brief of Amicus Curiae ACLU at 13-14, Dickerson II (No. 97-4750) (citing American
Bar Association, Criminal Justice in Crisis, 27, 33-34 (1988)).
206 Id. at 13-14.
20' Brief of Amicus Curiae NACDL at 2, Dickerson II (No. 97-4750).
' See infra note 177 and accompanying text.
209 Appellee's Petition for Rehearing at 11 n.4, Dickerson 11 (No. 97-4750).
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Additionally, he asks the court to refrain from deciding issues not raised by
a party entitled to raise them when failure to consider the issues is not plain
error. Thus, the defense attorney tries to contextualize the doctrinal issue and
establish its import for the defendant.
Like the WLF, the defense and its amici occasionally overstate their
arguments, using bold, unequivocal language. The NACDL, for example, says
the cases the WLF rely upon "actually reaffirm Miranda: Harris, Tucker, and
Elstad merely refuse to extend the holding of Miranda, and Quarles creates
only a narrow exception for exigent circumstances. Thus... the cases offer
no support for the conclusion that Miranda is not constitutionally
compelled."2'0 Yet, generally, hyperbolic certainty is avoided and arguments
are made affirmatively but fairly. For example, whereas the WLF cites Harris
for the proposition that "self-incriminating statements" given while in custody
are admissible even though "the Miranda rules were not complied with,"2"
NACDL amicus carefully qualifies those holdings, noting that, in Harris, the
statements made in violation of Miranda were deemed admissible for
impeachment purposes, not as evidence of guilt, and thus, that "Harris
reaffirms the core holding of Miranda, which 'barred the prosecution from
making its case with statements of an accused ... prior to ... waiving
counsel." 2 2 While the law is framed favorably by the defense and its amici,
the cases and their context are fully given and cogently distinguished or
circumscribed.
Moreover, these legal arguments are made with conviction but without
excess - there are no ad hominem violations. Neither the attorney for the
defense nor amici counsel for the ACLU and NACDL refer to opposing
counsel, and they mention the Fourth Circuit panel only to summarize its
decision or suggest an error.213 Sarcasm and mockery are not employed - only
the occasional exaggeration undermines the ethical persona the attorneys
create in their briefs.
These attorneys benefit from role consistency in Audi's sense. Defending
the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against compelled self-incrimination, they
also defend the respect for the integrity and dignity of all persons in which
that guarantee is grounded. In so doing, they merge their professional roles
as defense counsel and lobbyist with the role of moral agent. This enables
them to comply with Audi's motivational and proportionality principles and
to adhere to an ethic of logos, ethos, and pathos. They give both their legal
210 Brief of Amicus Curiae NACDL at 11, Dickerson 11 (No. 97-4750).
21 Brief of WLF in Opposition to Rehearing at 5-6, Dickerson H (No. 97-4750).
212 Brief of Amicus Curiae NACDL at 11, Dickerson II (No. 97-4750).
213 Brief of Amicus Curiae 'NACDL at 6, 9, 11, 14, 15, Dickerson 11 (No. 97-4750);
Appellee's Petition for Rehearing at 4, 7 n.2, 8, 9, 10, Dickerson H (No. 97-4750).
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and their policy arguments, and clearly articulate their premises and their
reasoning.
An examination of these five briefs suggests that many characteristics
common to advocacy rhetoric are not only unethical, but - to a critical and
sensitive reader- ineffective. It is worth considering whether, as a profession,
we may need to refine our notions of persuasiveness to improve both our
image and our lawyering.'
C. The Rhetoric of Legal Scholarship
The rhetoric of advocacy permeates legal scholarship. This may be a
consequence of what has traditionally been its primary purpose, which is to
analyze a legal problem and to prove the superiority of one of perhaps several
solutions. Or it may be because legal scholars are trained to be advocates and
become scholars without training in scholarly method or rhetoric. Whatever
the reason, legal scholars adopt a rhetoric similar to that of advocate and
judge.
[T]he legal scholar adopts a voice that is objective, neutral, impersonal,
authoritative, judgmental, and certain. It is a disembodied voice that implicitly
denies any contingency upon the cultural or personal circumstances of the author
In keeping with our objective and acontextual stance, we treat other people's
texts as if they too were objective and acontextual. And in pursuing our purpose
of finding the one right answer to our questions, we tend to approach other
people's texts ... as if they had one and only one true meaning. Thus, our
rhetoric on the subject of texts is usually, at least implicitly, a rhetoric of
exclusivity, of judgment and closure, and of one objective and ascertainable
meaning ....
[Tihe rhetoric of legal scholarship is also distinguished by the style of its
argument and proof. Our arguments are highly rational. They are made in the
spirit ... of deductive, syllogistic logic. They aspire to the linearity of a
geometric proof .... We use them to control our reader at every point and
essentially to compel her assent. Thus, we seek to prove, to a high level of
certainty, that ours is the one right - or in any event the best - answer."'
24 There is some empirical research suggesting that traditional techniques of persuasion in
appellate briefs do not, in fact, persuade judges. See James F. Stratman, Investigating
Persuasive Processes in Legal Discourse in Real Time: Cognitive Biases and Rhetorical
Strategy in Appeal Court Briefs, 23 DISCOURSE PROCESSES 1 (1994).
"'5 Wetlaufer, supra note 4, at 1568-71.
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Yet, this adversarial stance may not be particularly well-suited to " the
disinterested pursuit of truth.' 216  Although specious arguments "will
doubtless be exposed and refuted in the end, [a] discipline would be better
served if it could devote all of its energies to open, intellectually honest
debate, rather than having to divert precious time to ferreting out the
misrepresentations and other dishonest tactics employed... to win the debate
by any means possible.""1 7
United States v. Dickerson has not yet generated a body of scholarship upon
which an analysis of scholarly rhetoric can be based. Yet, there is sufficient
commentary on issues related to Miranda to make some general observations
about how the language of legal scholarship echoes the rhetoric of advocacy.
We focus here on an article by Paul G. Cassell,18 on a short reply to Cassell's
article by supporters of Miranda,1 9 on an article deploring police over-
reaction to Miranda,2'° and on an article outlining the dangers of interrogation
outside of Miranda."2
Cassell's article is about the deleterious effect Miranda has on law
enforcement generally, and on how it fails to protect victims and innocent
suspects. He advances three propositions. First, he attempts to prove
statistically that coerced false confessions are so rare they do not justify
placing restrictions on police interrogation. Second, he argues that the
Miranda warnings and waiver requirements hinder the police from obtaining
confessions that could exonerate innocent suspects who gave false confessions
and that could protect society from crimes committed by felons set free by
Miranda. Finally, he proposes that the court substitute videotapes of
confessions for Miranda warnings since videotaping can secure confessions
while diminishing the chances of coercion.
In making these arguments, Cassell uses a number of rhetorical strategies
that violate Audi's threshold and desirability principles. Cassell's first
argument is based on a problematic premise, namely that the number of false
confessions obtained through police coercion is so low that it does not justify
216 Id. at 1594-95.
2" Nicholas Dixon, The Adversary Method in Law and Philosophy, 30 THE PHIOSOPHICAL
FORUM 13, 22 (1999). The problem is not limited to legal scholarship; Dixon argues that the
dirty tricks of adversarial debate have no place in philosophy.
218 Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the innocent from False Confessions and Lost Confessions,
and from Miranda, 88 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 497 (1998). Professor Cassell wrote the pro
§ 3501 briefs in Dickerson I1; his scholarship is cited in Dickerson 11. See supra note 108.
29 See Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, Using the Innocent to Scapegoat Miranda:
Another Reply to Paul Cassell, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 557 (1998).
o See Fred E. Inbau, Over-Reaction - The Mischief of Miranda v. Arizona, 73 J. CRIM.
LAw & CRIMINOLOGY, 797 (1982).
"22 See Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELLL. REV 109 (1998).
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Miranda-like restrictions on interrogation. There are both normative and
empirical problems with this premise.
To begin with the empirical problem, Leo and Ofshe argue that Cassell's
method of quantifying false confessions "has no credible empirical
foundation."2" They point out that it is impossible to estimate the number of
police-induced false confessions because interrogations are not recorded in
their entirety. Moreover, no record is made of the number of interrogations
conducted, the number of confessions that result from interrogation, or the
number of confessions sooner or later revealed to be false. Thus the numbers
Cassell comes up with are speculative.
Indeed, Leo and Ofshe believe Cassell deliberately misreads their own
study when he says that he will assume that Leo and Ofshe are correct that
twenty-nine persons were wrongfully convicted from false confessions in the
last quarter century. Leo and Ofshe never said there were only twenty-nine
wrongful convictions resulting from false confessions.
Cassell's decision to treat either our sixty case examples or the twenty-nine
convictions as though they constitute what we believe to be the entire relevant
population of false confessions resulting in wrongful convictions from 1973 to
1996 is both fallacious and ideology-serving. We were able to investigate only
a small fraction of the disputed police interrogations that occurred in this twenty-
three year interval. Cassell's implication that only twenty-nine wrongful
convictions from false confessions occurred during this time period is therefore
misleading. As we made clear in our article, our descriptive statistics summarize
variation in the case outcomes of the set of false confessions we studied. We
have no idea what proportion of the false confessions occurring during this
twenty-three year period we have discovered.'
To misread a study and then refute it based on that misreading is to raise
strawman arguments and avoid the issue.
Cassell's numbers are even less reliable and their premises less valid, Leo
and Ofshe observe, because he arbitrarily shrinks the pool of false confessors
only to those wrongfully convicted. In reality,
the harms that the criminal justice system inflicts on false confessors are not
limited to wrongful incarceration post-conviction, but also include wrongful (and
sometimes lengthy) pre-trial deprivation of liberty, the stigma associated with
criminal charges, the irrevocable loss of reputation, the stresses of standing trial
and the sometimes bankrupting financial burdens of defending oneself in costly
and drawn out proceedings against the state.'
2 Leo & Ofshe, supra note 219, at 558.
223 Id. at 565. Indeed Leo's study was on "routine interrogation practices, not false
confessions." Id at 565.
"2 Id. at 564.
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Cassell's speculative and arbitrary statistical manipulation is particularly
dangerous when directed at an audience unfamiliar with statistical
interpretation and vulnerable to false implicature. Such readers can be easily
misled into believing that an argument has a solid scientific foundation when
no such foundation exists. 25
More to the point, and despite Cassell's contention that the risks of
Miranda are "an empirical or 'numbers' issue that cannot be resolved.., by
theoretical reasoning," '26 these quantifications are entirely irrelevant under
one theory of constitutional interpretation because the public policy interests
and constitutional rights implicated are largely indifferent to quantification
of occurrence. 7  The issue is the unconstitutionality of coercion, not the
number of coerced false confessions, or even the number of coerced true
confessions. Thus, many readers would be unimpressed by Cassell's attempt
to gain the reader's good opinion by articulating his willingness to "shoulder
the burden of quantification" when he thinks that burden "is properly
assigned''2 8 to Miranda's supporters. Proponents of Miranda would reject his
innuendo that they bear the burden of empirical analysis or that they are
evasive because they use "anecdotal example[s] .,229 They would not find it
"curious" that "false confession literature never provides even a ballpark
estimate of the frequency of false confessions" 2" because they would regard
those estimates as both impossible to obtain and as irrelevant.
'i. Consider the difficulty in assessing the truth of the following passage from Cassell:
An alternative, second-best approach is to derive an estimate based on assumption about
the frequency of wrongful convictions and the proportion of these convictions attributable
to false confessions. The approach has the benefit of working even with extremely low
probability events. In theory, estimating this number is straightforward:
WC subFC = CV x ER x FC, where
WC subFC is the number of wrongful convictions from false confessions,
CV is the number of convictions in the system,
ER is the error rate in the system, and
FC is the proportion of the errors attributable to false confessions.
The difficult part, of course, is in deriving empirically-based estimates of the error rate
(ER) and the proportion due to false confessions (FC).
Id. at 513.
226 Id. at 500.
rn See Weisselberg, supra note 221, at 175-77; see also Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's
Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 91 Nw. U. L. REV.
500 (1996); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda and Clearance Rates, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 278
(1996); Leslie Lunney, The Erosion of Miranda: Stare Decisis Consequences, 48 CATH. U. L.
REV. 727,786 (1999).
228 Cassell, supra note 218, at 501.
229 Id. at 500.
230 id.
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By casting his argument in quantitative terms - no matter how flawed his
assumptions, and no matter how contrived its reasoning - Cassell eschews the
doctrinal arguments traditionally necessary to argue before legal scholars that a
Supreme Court decision - one of the most famous and influential Supreme Court
decisions, no less - should be overturned. 3
Cassell also argues that the "exotic" problem of false confessions232 is no
trade off for the benefits of unrestricted interrogation or the harm of Miranda
warnings. Leo and Ofshe maintain that the harms Cassell perceives are based
on false dichotomies and speculation.
According to Cassell, there are two scenarios that describe how Miranda harms
the innocent. Under the first, Cassell's frustrated detective scenario, a guilty
criminal suspect, who can be arrested only if he confesses, fails to do so, but
instead invokes one of his Miranda rights and escapes arrest. Cassell supposes
that in the absence of a rule requiring police to issue Miranda warnings to
custodial suspects, the guilty party would not have refused to confess and would
have been arrested and convicted. In the frustrated detective scenario, having
failed to obtain a confession from the truly guilty party, the detective goes on and
interrogates some conveniently available innocent suspect. The innocent not
only waives Miranda, but thereafter gives a false confession. The innocent is
then wrongly convicted. 33
These scenarios are flawed, Leo and Ofshe argue, because they assume
suspects who have not been Mirandized inevitably confess and that police
officers who have been "foiled by a Miranda invocation"2 34 give up a pursuit
of a strong suspect to go after an innocent. The ensuing conclusion that
Miranda is therefore a danger to innocents must be dismissed, say Leo and
Ofshe, because it is based on false alternatives and questionable assumptions,
violations of logos.
Leo and Ofshe conclude that if Cassell's goal is to protect the innocent from
miscarriages of justice, his rhetoric backfires. Cassell should instead
redirect his energies to the advocacy of tougher safeguards to protect custodial
suspects and criminal defendants - not only against police-induced false
confession, but also against other prominent sources of wrongful convictions
such as eyewitness misidentification, the prosecutorial withholding of exculpa-
tory evidence, the use of perjured testimony by so-called jailhouse informants,
and ineffective assistance of counsel. For it is these kinds of abuses - not the
constitutionally-based Miranda warnings - that lead to miscarriages of justice
' Leo & Ofshe, supra note 219, at 574.
232 Cassell, supra note 218, at 502.
n Leo & Ofshe, supra note 219, at 571-72.
n4 Id. at 572.
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in the first place and that prevent the exoneration of the wrongfully convicted
incarcerated.'
If, however, Cassell's goal is to win, these misleading tactics are
understandable.
Indeed, the very "conceit" of Cassell's article - abolishing Miranda
warnings in order to protect innocents within the criminal justice system as
well as innocent victims of crime - is both disingenuous and manipulative.
Cassell is driven by the "misuse of our justice system by criminal
defendants"236 far more than he is by the plight of an innocent person
frightened into false confession by coercive police tactics. This motivation is
revealed when Cassell says "Blackstone's adage that ten guilty should go free
rather than one innocent be convicted remains true today. But Blackstone's
adage also reminds us that acceptable trade-offs are not unlimited. In
evaluating an interrogation regime, the risks to innocents from inadequate
crime control must also be assessed."" This misreading of Blackstone is not
surprising given that, as amici curiae for the WLF/SSC in Dickerson, Cassell
admits he is primarily concerned with "cases in which technical Miranda
claims have resulted in the release of dangerous criminals." 238 Harm to
innocent false confessors is but an excuse for Cassell to discuss confessions
that are "lost" because of Miranda, a decision he, in an appeal from pathos,
characterizes as "the epitome of Warren Court activism on behalf of criminal
defendants." 9
As we have seen, Cassell's emotional ploys and logical fallacies render
much of Leo and Ofshe's critique valid, not the least because Cassell's tactics
obscure the grounds on which the debate should center. Yet, Leo and Ofshe's
critique is marred by their own attitude to their rival. Their reply confirms
Dixon's suspicion that "the use of a hostile and belligerent tone" is
"intrinsically undesirable, since it shows a lack of respect for one's opponent"
- although it is unlikely a "friendly, non-confrontational approach" would
make the opponents of this debate "more likely to be open-minded about the
strength" of each other's arguments.' Nonetheless, honest argument and
courteous discussion would certainly be more edifying and respectful of their
audience.
Leo and Ofshe keep up a barrage of sarcastic ad hominem attacks on
Cassell," employing language that depicts him as out-of-control. He is
73 Id at 576-77.
236 Brief of Amici Curiae WLFISSC at 2, Dickerson H (No. 97-4750).
237 Cassell, supra note 218, at 499
238 Brief of Amici Curiae WLF/SSC at 2, Dickerson II (No. 97-4750).
239 Cassell, supra note 218, at 555.
240 Dixon, supra note 217, at 18.
24' Leo & Ofshe, supra note 219, at 557.
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accused of launching a "single handed assault" on Miranda.'2 He is sneered
at for his exaggeration, his "steady stream of speculative accusations that
Miranda causes tens of thousands of guilty suspects to escape conviction.
He is accused of "Miranda-bashing,"'2" a term evocative of "gay-bashers."
He ignores, we are told, "most researchers' preference for an honest 'I don't
know' to the use of guesswork to arrive at specious estimates.""45 "Like the
Emperor who wears no clothes.... Cassell's argument here is based solely on
illusion."' 1 His scenarios are so "highly implausible as to seem fanciful." '247
His argument that Miranda harms the innocent is but another "rhetorical
weapon in his highly charged anti-Miranda crusade.""
There may be good reason to condemn speculative quantitative analyses
because of the "fateful consequences" these analyses have on human lives, as
Leo and Ofshe say. 9 Some indignation may even be appropriate, but the
acrimonious and sarcastic name-calling in which these authors indulge results
in a loss of ethical integrity that serves neither their audience nor their cause.
Not all legal scholarship is so deeply marred. Fred E. Inbau was one of the
most vocal opponents of Miranda, yet, unlike Cassell, he makes his arguments
without rhetorical excess. '  Likewise Charles Weisselberg, a supporter of
Miranda, uses no rhetorical dirty tricks despite his ideological commitment."
In a representative article,1 2 Inbau argues that Miranda displays a "lack of
sound judicial reasoning." 3 He also decries the "mischief" that occurs when
official "over-reaction" to Miranda convinces otherwise willing suspects not
to confess. 4 Inbau's choice of the word "mischief" is typical of his rhetorical
strategy; he uses a term that conveys gratuitous harm but does not raise the
emotional decibel-level, deploring but not resorting to ad populem abuse of
pathos. His anti-Miranda scholarship is also notable because it takes on the
242 id.
243 Id. at 558.
244 Id. at 560.
245 Id. at 561.
246 Id. at 575
247 Id. at 574
248 Id. at 576.
249 id. at 575
I .flee Inbau, supra note 220, at 797. See infra notes 253-55 and accompanying text for
discussion.
2 See Weisselberg, supra note 221, at 109.
252 See generally Inbau, supra note 220.
1 He faults the Court for using the right to counsel, which by the text of the 6th
Amendment applies to criminal prosecutions (and not to investigations), to protect against 5th
Amendment violations during custodial interrogation. Id. at 808.
25 Id. at 797-807.
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Warren Court on its own terms, starting from the premise of universal respect
that underlies Miranda.
The Miranda doctrine... was created as a product of the Warren Court's
pursuit of its egalitarian philosophy. Toward that objective the basic
consideration was this: the rich, the educated, the intelligent suspect very
probably knows from the outset that he has the privilege of silence, whereas the
poor, the uneducated, or the unintelligent suspect is unaware of that privilege.
Consequently, all persons in custody or otherwise deprived of their freedom,
must receive the warnings prescribed in Miranda.
As commendable as is much of what the Warren Court attempted or
accomplished with its egalitarian philosophy in the area of social inequalities
emanating from a disregard of clearly applicable constitutional provisions, the
writer suggests that the same egalitarian philosophy does not lend itself to the
field of criminal investigation. Foremost is the fact that a very high percentage
of the victims of crime are from the ranks of the poor, the uneducated, or the
unintelligent. It is of little comfort to them to be told that the warnings
admipistered to the person suspected of robbing or raping them, or of
burglarizing their homes while they were at work, was for the noble purpose of
equalizing humanity, and this is especially so in those instances where the
suspect, reasonably presumed to be guilty, accepted the invitation to remain
silent, or where his conviction was reversed because the Miranda rights were not
properly accorded him. The time to show compassion toward a criminal
suspect's unfortunate background is after a determination of whether or not he
committed the offense, not before.255
Inbau leaves the reader free to accept or reject his "suggestions," to make a
hard choice between two moral high-grounds.
On the opposite side of the debate, but with similar courtesy, Weisselberg,
in Saving Miranda, tries to capture the Warren Court's "vision" of Miranda
and directly addresses the question of "whether this Article's characterization
of the Court's 'original vision' is fair., 2" He attempts to convince us it is by
laying out his reasons - by summarizing opposing readings and the grounds
he has for rejecting therr3 7 He similarly traces the encroachments on, and
reinforcements of, Miranda that have been made since that ruling,
acknowledging - like the Department of Justice in Dickerson - Miranda's
somewhat bewildering and ambiguous history."8 In supplying the reader with
155 Id. at 808-09.
26 Weisselberg, supra note 221, at 122.
I d. at 122-24 (pointing to language in the opinion and exchanges between Chief Justice
Warren and Justice Brennan that support his contention that Miranda governs police practices
as well trial rights).
" Id. at 125-32. Weisselberg accepts Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224-25 (1971),
Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975), Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974),and New York
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his sources and reasoning, in providing - where applicable - alternative
readings, and in making his refutations explicit, Weisselberg demonstrates his
scholarly pursuit of truth. His subscriptive advocacy is stronger for it.
Weisselberg argues in this essay that encroachments on Miranda have
created significant incentives for police to violate its strictures. 25 9 Because
courts now admit "un-mirandaized' testimony for impeachment purposes,
some police are now trained to interrogate "outside Miranda." He, thus, urges
we return to Miranda's original vision and bar confessions for impeachment
purposes as well as evidence that results from "un-mirandaized" testimony.
In other words, he advocates a return to the strict bright line rule vision.
In arguing this, Weisselberg, like Leo and Ofshe, takes on some of Paul
Cassell's proposals. Cassell suggests the Court modify the warning to
dispense with the offer of counsel and the requirement that police terminate
interrogation when a suspect invokes his or her rights. In their place, Cassell
suggests police officers videotape their interrogations since this is effective in
preventing coercion. Weisselberg explains equably why this solution is not
tenable.
Telling officers that they need not cease questioning when a suspect invokes his
or her rights simply sends police and courts back into the Fourteenth
Amendment morass of soft standards. Without a bright line rule, how does an
officer or a judge decide the point at which questioning overcomes a suspect's
will? The number of times an accused asserts his or her rights certainly plays a
role in the voluntariness inquiry. But must a suspect invoke several times to
show that he or she is truly serious about remaining silent? Miranda simply
presumes coercion when interrogation continues after a single invocation of the
right .... Admittedly, videotaping would help resolve disputes about what was
actually said and done during an interrogation; further, officers who know that
they are on videotape also may refrain from clearly inappropriate conduct. Yet,
in the end, videotaping cannot replace Miranda. A judge may review the
videotape to decide a suppression motion, but will still decide the motion under
a soft and value-laden standard. 2"
v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984), as cases establishing a new vision of Miranda in which the
Court tries to "deconstitutionalize" the case and thereby allow statements taken in violation of
Miranda to be used for impeachment and the collection of other evidence. Id. On the other
hand, he regards Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993), as a significant counterweight; it
places Miranda alongside other cases that establish the constitutional authority of prophylactic
rules. Id.
29 d at 111.
260 Id. at 166.
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Not only does Weisselberg spell out his reasons for rejecting Cassell's
proposal, but he is careful to do so on the merits. Besides describing Cassell
as "Miranda's most ardent critic,"26' he comments on him not at all.262
Inbau and Weisselberg's approach to scholarship has much to commend it
and can help us to construct an ethic of rhetoric, one that is as appropriate for
a judge as it is for a scholar.
I. TRADITIONAL DEFENSES OF ROLE-DIFFERENTIATED LEGAL RHETORIC
Like role-differentiated behavior in general, role-differentiated legal
rhetoric is not without articulate defenders and plausible defenses. In this
section, we summarize those defenses and explain why, at the end of the day,
we find them unconvincing.
Those who defend legal rhetoric speak from the viewpoint of the advocate
and the adversary system. To the charge that legal roles disassociate speakers
from their arguments and, thereby, obscure the truth and violate the duty of
universal moral agency, defenders, such as Jack Sammons and J.B. White,
reply that the legal system and legal culture justify some seeming abuses and
provide constraints against the rest.
First, according to these defenders, the legal system renders the adversarial
performances of advocates moral in that they provide jury and judge with the
optimal arguments that each party can make, and, thus, help a decisionmaker
to "think" through the case and arrive at a just decision.263 Accordingly, even
if an advocate uses weak or non-motivating arguments,
to refuse to use them based on... personal assessment of their merit would be
equivalent, in... [a] baseball analogy, to taking the ball and going home - a
pretentious assertion of self in what is supposed to be a communal activity. I
must instead leave such arguments to the judge orthejury for their consideration
consistent with their particular roles within the legal conversation. These men
and women may not be the measure of all things, but, for the lawyer as
rhetorician, they are and must remain the measure of all things within the legal
conversation.2
261 Id.
262 Weisselberg also criticizes Cassell's quantitative analyses on both empirical and
theoretical grounds. Weisselberg, supra note 221, at 170-77. But, although he observes that
Cassell "provides the wrong answers to the wrong questions," id. at 176, he deals with Cassell's
arguments on the merits. Id. at 170-77.
263 James Boyd White, Plato's Gorgias and the Modem Lawyer: A Dialogue on the Ethics
ofArgument, in HERACLES' Bow 215,226 (1995).
2" See Jack L. Sammons, The Radical Ethics of Legal Rhetoricians, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 93,
99 (1997). Sammons is an eloquent advocate respectful of opposing viewpoints. Yet his
analogy of the adversary system - where the stakes can be as high as human life - to baseball
seems to trivialize the debate. And the analogy of law to a game among men may say more than
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This defense of legal rhetoric is problematic. First, the rhetoric of advocacy
cannot be defended simply on the ground that it is required by the adversary
system in that it assists in the truth-seeking function of a trial. In fact, there
is a good likelihood that rhetorical excesses only compound the difficulty of
ascertaining truth. It is a mistake to think that "conflicting biases and
distortions will somehow cancel themselves out and result in a truthful verdict
.... On the contrary, the more distortions that occur, the less likely the truth
will emerge. '
Further, a defense of the rhetoric of advocacy as necessary to the
functioning of the adversary system is only as good as that institution. Indeed,
justice will prevail "only if the contest is a balanced one - that is, if each side
has roughly equal access to relevant legal information, resources and
capabilities." 2" Even then, the very effectiveness of partisanship is unproven,
"a mix of a priori theories of inquiry and armchair psychology."'267
Finally, even if the adversary system justifies a litigator's use of an
unchecked rhetoric of persuasion, such justifications do not pertain to other
legal players. The problem here is that lawyers seem to change roles more
easily than they change their behavior, and, as we have seen in Part II of this
article, the win-at-all-costs rhetoric rooted in the adversary system finds fertile
ground in judicial and scholarly prose.2'
A second defense of legal rhetoric holds that advocacy rhetoric is not as
unbridled as some legal ethicists allege, but rather, that it is constrained by
institutional and practical considerations.
The game of lawyering is a particular conversation about certain social
disputes. If lawyers are to continue to play this game, that is, if they are to
continue to be lawyers . . ., they must accept the responsibility, as all game
players must, of maintaining the game,....
Accordingly, I am always obligated, as a lawyer, to speak as persuasively as
I can, but I am also obligated to maintain the legal conversation and the quality
of it. Part of this constraint is that I can only utilize the means of persuasion
available within this particular rhetorical culture, just as a baseball player can
only use a bat within a certain size and weight range. My ethical obligation,
then, as a good rhetorician, my integrity as a lawyer, if you will, is that I always
the writer intends.
Dixon, supra note 217, at 21.
26 Deborah L. Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics, in THELEGALPRoFEssIoN: RESPONSIBILITY
AND REGULATION 203 (Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Deborah L. Rhode, eds., 3d ed. 1994).
" David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS AND
LAwYERs' ETics 91 (David Luban ed., 1983).
2' As Gerald Wetlaufer observes: "Within the discipline of law, there are systematic
similarities between the rhetorical conventions of advocacy, judging, scholarship, and teaching."
Wetlaufer, supra note 4, at 1587.
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present myself as honestly offering the best means of persuasion available within
this particular rhetorical culture on behalf of my client.2'
Sammons identifies some of the constraints on rhetoric imposed by the legal
context.
There are great constraints on rhetoric found in the efficiencies of the forms
of persuasion most successful within this particular rhetorical community; great
constraints on rhetoric in the nature of the particular audiences -judge,jury, and
opposing counsel - addressed; great constraints in the particular casuistical and
interpretive requirements of legal decision-making; great constraints in the
necessary imposition of this rhetorical game upon the clients who enter it; great
constraints in the representative nature of the advocacy with its requirement that
the lawyer speak well for others, and the counseling and relationship essential
to this speaking."0
Defenders also cite the constraints imposed by the profession on specific
rhetorical practices: "lying, certain forms of deception, perjured testimony,
preventing opposing arguments, misstating the law, tempting the judge to
make decisions based upon means of persuasion that are not part of the
rhetorical culture, and any other conduct that can fairly be described as 'not
playing the game.' 27'
We believe that the constraints Sammons identifies as ensuring ethical
language behavior are not fully effective: both the nature of legal rhetoric and
its practice are impediments to meaningful constraint.
The rhetoric of law aims to convince its audiences that the legal system and
the decisions it engenders are impersonal, objective, forthright, reasonable,
and fair.272 It does this, Gerald Wetlaufer argues, by compelling acceptance
and forestalling critique through reliance on
authority, hierarchy, intellectual unity, the impersonal voice, coercive
argumentation, appeals to the narrowly rational faculties, the one right answer,
the best solution, the disciplines of closure, and the one objective and
ascertainable meaning of texts.... [and to] the extinguishment of contingency,
to acontextuality, to the one objective perspective, to an audience ... perfectly
rational and thus perfectly undifferentiated.. ...
Moreover, as we have undertaken to show, these rhetorical practices are
present in all types of legal documents: to varying degrees, briefs, opinions,
269 Sammons, supra note 264.
270 Id. at 101.
271 Id. at 99.
272 Admittedly, legal rhetoric is not always successful in its goal. A close and expert reader
can often detect rhetorical manipulation.
273 Wetlaufer, supra note 4, at 1587.
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and scholarly articles present themselves as the "last word," even when those
words offer a feigned and imperfect resolution.
Militating against legal rhetoric's impulse to closure, Sammons reassures,
are restraints on rhetoric that the legal community has allegedly placed upon
itself. Model rules and codes of conduct eschew the practice of lies,
deception, misstatement of law and fact, concealment of adverse decisions.274
Yet, perhaps because the very practices condemned serve closure so well,
these rules are clearly unequal to the task. Advancing, as they so often do,
aspirational rather than mandatory standards, and so often relying on legal
rather than moral or rhetorical notions of deceit, they fail to prevent all but the
most egregious misconduct. As a result, the profession does not consistently
practice what it preaches.
Finally, defenders have faith that any ethical improprieties that survive
these constraints can be rectified by an ongoing and honest conversation about
the nature and the practice of law.275
That we are responsible for how we speak and who we are; that self-conscious
thought on these questions is among the most important tasks of a mature mind
(or people); and that to establish a place of our own making from which cultural
and ethical criticism can go on is essential to responsible life... and... the life
of the lawyer.""V6
Moreover, as one defender notes, "[tihe character required for this inquiry into
the profession is broader than the practice, but still required by it. This is, I
believe, the way in which our professional roles are integrated with the rest of
our lives"27 and, he might add, the way moral fragmentation is avoided.
274 See e.g., MoDELRULEsOFPROFESSIONALCONDUCT(1999). Rule 3.1 bars a lawyer from
asserting an issue unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous. Model rule 3.3
prohibits making a false statement of material fact or law to the tribunal, failing to disclose
adverse authority, and knowingly offering false evidence. Model rule 3.4 prohibits obstructing
access to or altering evidentiary material. Rule 4.4 prohibits a lawyer from using means that
have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person. Rule 8.4
make it professional misconduct to violate the professional rules, to commit a criminal act that
reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other
respects, to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, or to
engage in conduct prejudicial to the administration ofjustice. Canon EC- 1-5 of the Model Code
of Professional Responsibility (1982) urges lawyers to be temperate and dignified, and to refrain
from all illegal and morally reprehensible conduct. The Disciplinary Rules of the ABA Model
Code of Professional Responsibility (1982) make a lawyer subject to discipline for making a
materially false statement (DR 1-101), for engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation, or in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice (DR 1-
102).
275 See Sammons, supra note 264, at 100; White, supra note 70, at 867.
276 White, supra note 263, at 237.
2' Sammons, supra note 264, at 100.
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Dialogue about legal culture and ethics is undoubtedly a good thing. But
the conversation must be broad-based, encompassing not just academics, but
practitioners and judges as well, and it must be implemented, not just
examined. To curb ethical improprieties in any meaningful way, the
profession must erect "a normative scale on which to judge legal behavior"
and perform "a forthright analysis of such behavior as it is practiced." 78 The
standards adopted must reflect "the strength of an ethical system" rather than
the "professional accommodation of the bad."279 In other words, rhetorical
practices that allow a lawyer to evade or misrepresent what Richard Weisberg
calls the "central reality of the situation" are practices that protect clients and
positions at the expense of truth.' Credibility, predictability, and justice
require commitment to ethical language practice.
IV. CONCLUSION
The solution to the problem of disrespectful legal rhetoric is as clear as it
is next to impossible: We have to change the way we talk and write, an
enterprise that begins with a profession-wide commitment to avoid rhetorical
practices that, by their nature, violate Audi's threshold and desirability
principles.
Like all solutions to complicated questions, this solution raises more
questions. To what extent, if at all, should there be different rules for different
roles? Should litigators be exempted from the duty of respectful rhetoric?
Should any such exemption be made only for criminal defense? Would a
defendant whose counsel conceded the weaknesses of an argument have her
rights to counsel and due process compromised? Before we make any
exemptions, should we conduct empirical research to determine whether
traditional advocacy rhetoric is in fact a more effective method of persuasion
than forthrightness and balance? Should judges be held to the highest ethical
standards because their words are so consequential? Although nothing
justifies aggression and nastiness in judicial rhetoric, might there nonetheless
be circumstances that justify violating the motivational and evidential
principles - to get a majority, to spare the feelings of the court below, or to
avoid hierarchical conflict, for example? Are these institutional arguments
sufficiently strong to override the constraints on otherwise undesirable
behavior? These are hard questions.
278 White, supra note 263, at 237.
' Richard H. Weisberg, Three Lessons from Law and Literature, 27 LOY. L.A. L REv. 285,
300(1993).
28 Weisberg, supra note 70, at 10.
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What seems certain, however, is that scholars should be held to the highest
ethical-rhetorical standard, because truth-seeking is a scholar' s primary goal.
There are strong reasons for holding judges to the same high standard.
Equally certain is that reform will not come from wishful thinking or from
rules of professional conduct but from a commitment to an ethic of universal
respect that is reflected in our use of language. The distinctions between
persuading and silencing and between putting something in its best light and
putting it in a false light are too important for mere lip service.

